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ABSTRACT
It is currently estimated that more than 200,000 high school and university students participate in
model United Nations each year. With over 400 annual conferences in thirty-five countries, this
fifty-year-old tradition has redefined how students engage international relations in an academic
setting (Educational Outreach 1). Active learning has been heralded for decades as a superior
technique to teach various disciplines, including international relations. It allows students to
experience deep learning and develop skills unattainable through conventional pedagogical
methods. This paper explores the specific impact of a model United Nations simulation on the
academic experience and student performance through a controlled and experiential testing in a
collegiate classroom. I devised and coordinated a simulated Security Council meeting (which
discussed Terrorism in Pakistan) and measured student performance before, during and after the
simulation, and then compared it to a control group. Four assessment mechanisms were used: pre
and post simulation evaluation of student position papers; achievement of Kolb’s Learning
phases and other in-class observations; student reflections from a debriefing session; and pre and
post simulation basic knowledge quizzes. The results conclude that role-playing and simulation
based learning can have an incredibly strong impact on a student’s education. The skills learned
in the simulation allowed students to outperform their peers and positioned them for more longterm academic growth.

HYPOTHESIS
Although standard lecture and other class projects have traditionally dominated the education
system, I contend that simulation based learning allows for a more rigorous, engaging, fun and
educational academic experience. This style of active learning is compatible for teaching across
the assortment of perspectives intrinsic to international relations teaching and scholarship.
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SIMULATION IN CONTEXT
As the world globalizes it becomes increasingly important for education to prepare students
properly for the complexities of the international community. Part of this preparation should be a
solid foundation in international relations (IR) theory, practice, and understanding. Students must
be able to think critically, creatively approach problems, work across cultures, interact with
philosophically opposing viewpoints, and collaborate to achieve a common goal. Yet there is a
challenge to teaching international relations as “complex realities of contemporary global politics
transcend many of the constructs useful for understanding the Cold War era.” (Lantis, Kuzma,
and Boehrer 2000:2) Globalization changes the way we live our lives every day. As a result, our
education should adopt methods to comprehend and adapt to these changes. Newman and Twigg
state that an educational process should cover the “full richness, complexity, drama, and
importance of international affairs.” (Newman and Twigg 2000:835) Instruction of international
relations needs to convey that the discipline is not black and white, and not a technical skill—it is
not something that can be simply tested. Students have to learn how to apply, examine, analyze,
and then reapply, as well overcome obstacles in pursuit of their goals.
The traditional approach (lecture and readings) to international studies education falls short of
preparing students with an adequate skill-set needed to operate effectively in a globalized world.
Even more so, it does not prepare future IR participants for the complexities of their work.
Kirsten Haack argues that conventional teaching “obstruct[s] the achievement of true deep
learning.” Traditional curricula has a tendency to “interrogate the subject through questions
aimed at a lower cognitive level.” (Haack 2008:395) Course content is primarily descriptive and
does not unearth why an organization operates the way it does, or how the international system
facilitates cooperation. Crossley-Frolick contends “that teaching international relations in today’s
world requires more pedagogical agility than ever” and “traditional lecture is limited in its
capacity to capture the imagination of students” (Crossley-Frolick 2010:2). Robert Barr and John
Tagg argue for a transformation from a lecture-oriented “instructional paradigm” to a new
“learning paradigm.” (Barr and Tagg 1995:13) These authors claim that the traditional
educational pedagogical model is not a holistic, student-centered approach. The current standard
falls short at developing “critical thinking skills, and elicit[ing] discovery and construction of
knowledge.”(Lantis 1998:41)
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Scholars have consistently praised active learning methods as the solution to the gap between the
desired education experience and the model which traditional approaches provide. Active
learning is defined as “learning based on discovery, inquiry and participation [and] is preferable
to passive, lecture-based learning.” (Cusimano 2000:79) This accepted form of achieving
qualitative “deep learning” in higher education helps students learn by creating meaning rather
than memorizing. Bigg’s and Collis’s Structure of the Observed Learning Outcome (SOLO)
taxonomy states that deep learning means an “increased ability to connect, synthesize, and
abstract knowledge while surface learning is evident where students merely pick up one or two
aspects of a task but do not establish any meaningful relationships between them.” (Haack
2008:396, Biggs 2003, and Mosely et al. 2005) Kolb’s Experiential Learning Model 1 has served
as the backbone of active learning conception since its introduction in the mid 1980s. Fox and
Ronkowski have articulated that the best learning experience is achieved when a student is
guided through all four of Kolb’s phases: concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract
conceptualization, and active experimentation (Fox and Ronkowski 1997:733). Kolb defines this
deep learning as a “process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of
experience.” (Kolb 1884:41) This process is highlighted by three key levels of progression: first,
students take an active role in their own learning; second, they connect theory to practice in the
outside world; and third, they integrate this knowledge into their own conceptual framework.
(Boud and Pascoe 1978:2) This process prepares students for generating knowledge in future
circumstances, trains them for “real-world” happenings, and incubates a sense of tolerance for
diverse perspectives.
An important and relevant type of active or experiential learning for the IR disciple is simulation.
Studies have shown that simulations “develop different skills from [conventional] classroom
teaching—especially those of being imaginative and innovative.” (Winham 1991:417) Lantis
believes that simulations can “truly enliven the international relations classroom and enhance the
learning experience.” (Lantis 1998:39) Other research has concluded that simulations are better
mechanisms for long-term retention of imperative IR concepts. (Newmann and Twigg 2000:835)
Further, simulations enhance the education experience by teaching students about international
negotiation (Kaufman 1998:59), generating empathy (Morgan 2003), promoting critical thinking,
1

David Kolb, and American educational theorist, developed the experiential learning theory (ELT) (see Appendix
A). Brock and Cameron have justified this project by applying Kolb’s ELT to the field of political science.
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and providing greater insight into the dynamics of international political exchange (Smith and
Boyer 1996:691). Simulations can even serve as a tool for teaching students how to recover and
move forward from failure. These themes are interwoven into a learning technique that
stimulates student participation and walks them through international and organizational conflict
and resolution by forcing students to interact with a problem rather than simply observing it.
A type of simulation which achieves these ends and fits well into IR curricula is model United
Nations (MUN). MUN is a role-playing exercise in which students assume positions of various
countries at a mock United Nations committee hearing (the committees and topics vary by
organizer choice). Hazleton and Mahurin have referred to the model UN experience as a
“learning laboratory” that can help increase “cognitive knowledge of diplomatic strategies and
outcomes; enhance understanding of key concepts and the complexities of the situations being
simulated; and reinforce, change and/or develop participant attitudes toward the objects of the
simulation.” (Hazleton and Mahurin 1986:151) Furthermore, Schlenker and Bonoma found that
the MUN environment fosters certain pressures and constraints on students (Bonoma and
Schlenker 1978:9-13). Within this setting, students have to tackle problems with limited
resources and options, widen their comprehension of the concepts, principles, and strategies
involved and devise solutions that they otherwise may not have considered. On a larger level,
MUN grants each student involved a unique and important experience. Students are thrust into
difficult and often controversial discussions about international peace, security, and
development. Through this type of simulation students gain an understanding about the UN and
the various underpinnings of the international community. This agile method of education
exposes them to conflict and alliance, failure and success, creative and critical thinking, and a
realistic atmosphere to test and evaluate theories and knowledge learned in class.
This paper supports the importance and integration of model United Nations into the IR learning
experience. Previous research on its applicability has assessed its flexibility through largely
external observational methods. Research has proven that MUN stimulates interest in IR and is
more enjoyable than traditional lecture style education—two traits which have been proven to
have positive effects on a student’s academic performance. This paper will measure how
simulation based learning, specifically model United Nations, can have an impact on academic
achievement in comparison to conventional course structure. There are three main components:
-5-

methodology, analysis, and conclusion. The methodology section will outline how I organized
the simulation and measured its impact for student learning and why these metrics were chosen.
The second section will present the results of my research and comment on their applicability
and meaning. The final section will comment on its utility in a classroom, provide suggestions
for future simulations, and evaluate the model United Nations simulation. By no means does this
paper aim to refute the existence of, or replace completely, traditional education methods, but
rather it contends that different pedagogical models—such as a model United Nations
simulation—can play a positive role while fulfilling external objectives not necessarily achieved
through conventional methods.
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METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
To value the effectiveness of model United Nations as part of an academic curriculum, I
conducted a simulation in an Introduction to International Global Politics (GLOB-241) course at
Bryant University. The students participated in a mock meeting of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC). Each student was paired up with a classmate and represented a member-state
of the Security Council or an additional participatory role. The Security Council convened for
four classes to discuss the issue of “Terrorism in Pakistan.” The simulation produced six
resolutions which reflected the class’ opinion on how the international community should
approach the issue. The results of this simulated classroom experience were measured against a
control group. This control group was a second Introduction to Global Politics class which was
taught by the same professor. This class had to undergo the same evaluation methods, but did not
participate in a simulation. Instead, the class was given traditional lectures by their regular
professor about the United Nations and the situation in Pakistan.
While there is no definitive formula on how to conduct simulations (whether model UN or not),
there is a list of suggested criteria among academics. Simulations should have clearly stated
objectives (Kille 2002), a vigilant design and assessment process (Shaw 2004), operate under
clear rules of procedure and protocol (Lantis 2000; Zeff 2003; Asal 2005; Chasek 2005), include
good student preparation for role-playing (Asal 2005), and conclude with a structured debriefing
and reflection session (Petranek 2000). Fortuitously, simulating the United Nations provides a
natural framework for the experience. This simulation’s design mimics an actual Security
Council meeting as much as possible (details on the assessment process will be addressed later in
“Assessment Mechanisms”). To represent accurately a UNSC meeting, delegates follow slightly
modified United Nations rules of procedure. In this case, the specific rules were drawn from the
National High School Model United Nations Conference. These rules allow for the optimum
amount of flexibility while maintaining a realistic atmosphere (See “Preparation”). Good student
preparation is ensured through the provision of a Background Guide on the topic (more details
below). Each student (known during the simulation as a delegate) is also required to submit a
position paper outlining his/her representative stance on the topic before the Security Council.
Further, a sound understanding of the simulation’s goals and objectives is imperative because the
instructor will have to guide debate on an ad-hoc basis. Lastly, a debriefing and reflection
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session will clarify student thinking, reinforce specific teaching points, and link the simulation to
“real life." As this paper will outline below, this simulation incorporated all of these important
aspects through its inception and execution.
The following sections will explain the learning objectives, how the topic was selected, the
simulation protocol, student preparation, and how roles were assigned. I will then cover the
logistics of the simulation itself, explain the importance and structure of the debriefing session,
outline my assessment mechanisms, and elucidate the details of the control group in this
exercise.
Learning Objectives
Bearing in mind that the “complex realities of contemporary global politics transcend many of
the constructs useful for understanding the Cold War era,” (Lantis, Kuzma and Boehrer 2000:2)
this simulation employed learning objectives to fill gaps present in the standard lecture method.
Straight forward lectures do not always capture the imagination of the new generation of
students. Consider the frequent objects in their lives—YouTube, Facebook, Google, and other
active tools that can instantly connect them to people and information worldwide. Instant
messaging on cell phones is much more interactive than a PowerPoint presentation by a
professor. As a result, there is much to gain pedagogically for instructors to adopt alternative
methods of instruction.
This simulation allows delegates to address multiple prominent topics in international relations.
Furthermore, it provides a platform through which delegates can examine the theories of national
sovereignty, power-politics, ability of the international community to respond to a certain
situation, reasoning behind global disagreement, and political deadlock over what sometimes
seems a simple issue. As this paper will explain during the test results and overview of the
debriefing exercise, the students who participated in the simulation underwent deep learning and
gained a better grasp on these important issues than their controlled counterparts.
The practice and profession of international affairs includes several aspects and requires certain
skill-sets that standard lectures and chapter readings cannot address. The way international
politics, business, and cultural exchanges are conducted effectively change the substance of the
interaction. Successful participation in the international field mandates the ability to negotiate,
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bargain, be diplomatic, develop contingency plans, understand incentive structures, analyze, and
respond to various state and organizational strategies. Krain and Lantis argue that students must
be able to “examine the motivations, behavioral constraints, resources and interactions among
institutional actors.” (Krain and Lantis 2006) This goal is challenged and often restricted under
the traditional lecture structure. However, a model United Nations meeting, which allows
students to live and work through a realistically simulated international community, creates an
opportunity for them to acquire, or at least practice, these abilities. Reading about international
organizations makes it difficult to understand their limitations, but interacting with them
heightens students’ abilities to participate effectively in international relations.
Topic Selection
As previously noted, the simulation is designed to place students in the shoes of Ambassadors
from various countries and organizations around the world, thus allowing them to simulate the
decision making process of global leaders. This simulation addressed the issue of Terrorism in
Pakistan. The topic was chosen for a few reasons: the relevance of terrorism in the realm of
international relations, increasing importance of Pakistan in South Asian politics, the impact on
global efforts in Afghanistan, the number of important states and organizations involved, and the
risk of nuclear fallout. Since 2001, terrorism has been a focal point of international security
discussions and decisions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) engaged the
Afghanistan territory in a 10+ year war which is still on-going. Countries around the world have
spent trillions on state security measures to protect them from terrorist attacks. Terrorism is a
seemingly looming and poorly understood threat to everyone everywhere. The relationship
between Pakistan and the rest of South Asia—namely India and Afghanistan – is largely
impacted by how well militia groups and terrorist networks are controlled in its Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP). Decreased
state control over these areas, as well as a fragmented relationship between the Pakistani military
and civilian government, sends warning signs to its neighboring countries. For example, weak
control over Pakistan’s western border allows frequent crossing of terrorists and supplies from
groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which undermines NATO’s efforts in the region. Moreover,
terrorist groups have used weak state control in the NWFP to plan and carry out attacks against
India, Pakistan’s arch enemy. There are numerous parties interested in Pakistan’s security and
the future of terrorist groups harbored in their country. China, India, Afghanistan, and the United
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States have obvious interests due to their regional ties or direct involvement in the issue.
However, states who have vested trade interests in South Asian markets are also threatened by an
unstable Pakistan. Aid organizations are concerned over the surging numbers of refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) the conflict has caused. Weak legal and police controls allow
opium and arms trade to flourish which undermines advancement efforts of Central and South
Asia. Last, but frequently at the top of many lists, is the concern over the security of Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal, both its military and energy resources. If a facility were to suffer an attack or
material was obtained by a rogue militia group, the fallout and international implications would
be devastating.
Simulation Protocol
This simulation operated under rules of procedure which mirrored those of the United Nations. I
used the National High School Model United Nations’ Rules of Procedure (see Appendix A).
These rules are thorough and formal. During the simulation, the delegates followed United
Nations protocol for speaking, caucusing, and proposing solutions. Rule 12 – Functions of the
Chairman -- grants the chair (the instructor) discretionary powers over certain motions. This
allows the instructor to guide debate in an effective, but not controlling manner. Because the
students participating in the simulation had little to no MUN exposure, I adjusted the rules to
allow for teaching moments. This allows the instructor to interject during the course of debate
and provide relevant information, guide delegates through a subtopic, comment on current
proposals, or explain a certain aspect of international relations. During my simulation, I stopped
the committee to explain the intricacies of international aid. There was a consensus among the
majority of delegates to provide Pakistan with some form of aid as a means of alleviating the
challenges. Yet, the delegates were struggling with the next steps. I paused the committee
session to explain the various forms of aid the Security Council could provide or request from
various agencies. I also walked the class through important aspects that one must consider when
requesting aid (i.e. Who will provide the aid? What kind of aid will be provided? How much aid
will be provided? Who will distribute the aid? Will Pakistan accept the aid? How will the aid be
monitored? When will the aid be distributed? etc.) Although this analysis and explanation took
about five minutes of debate time, it saved time in the long run because delegates came to
understand how best to approach some of the recommendations. Their solutions became more
targeted, practical, and thorough. There are multiple sets of rules available online from different
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conferences. I encourage anyone who wishes to run a simulation to adapt a set of rules and adjust
accordingly for his/her teaching preferences.
Preparation
Students were provided extensive resources to prepare for the simulation. Two weeks before the
start of the simulation, the students were provided an overview on what a simulation was, how it
will be conducted, and why it was important. After introducing the nature of the model UN
meeting, a Background Guide (BG), which I developed and wrote, was distributed (Appendix
C). This Background Guide is a 20 page document that introduced the delegates to the history of
the Security Council, included simulation guidelines, and outlined many facets of the topic under
consideration. The BG included an overview of “terrorism,” history of Pakistan, influence of
Islam on Pakistani politics and history, and the relevance of the Soviet-Afghan War. The BG
then explained the challenges of terrorism in Pakistan. Through an examination of the
geographic area of the FATA and NWFP, it outlined the rise of the Taliban and sectarian
violence. After setting the stage, it dove into the current status and concerns from the security,
political and humanitarian viewpoints. The BG concluded with an introduction to the important
terrorist groups in Pakistan.
The security section addressed the topics of Pakistan’s military defense capabilities, its nuclear
facilities, current efforts to control the arms trade, and channels to supply and equip terrorists.
The political section elaborated on the limitations imposed by self-rule (sovereignty), fiscal and
political accountability issues, economic ramifications of insurgency, counter-terrorism
legislation, and international assistance and collaboration. Under the humanitarian concerns
section, past peace treaties with terrorists and aid for internally displaced persons were
addressed. The final section of the topic overview within the BG outlined the history and
ambitions of four important terrorist organizations in Pakistan: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
Lashkar-e-Omar (“The Army of Omar”), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the Al-Qaeda
network. This section also examined why people join insurgent groups and various types of
terrorist attacks and the goals, effects and overall gains associated with different types of attacks.
Role Assignments
Following the topic introduction portion of the BG, there is a section detailing the role
assignments. As mentioned, each student was assigned a particular role to act out during the
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simulation. There were 36 students in the class, but only 15 members on the Security Council
(SC). Hence, students were randomly paired with partners and assigned to a country as a team.
Because there were three extra pairs needing assignment, I added positions to the SC meeting on
observational status. These students were allowed to debate, discuss, and propose solutions to the
topic, but were not allowed to vote. The positions of “Attaché from the NATO mission in
Afghanistan,” “Attaché from the UNHCR,” and an “International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Representative” were added to the Council. The NATO representative was added to
bring detailed knowledge about current multilateral efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The
United Nations High Commissioner’s for Refugees (UNHCR) representative was included to
ensure protection of Afghani and Pakistani refugees—this also presented a unique teaching
moment that the UNHCR could not help IDPs in Pakistan because they technically are not
refugees. Lastly, the IAEA representative was present to ensure substantial attention was paid to
Pakistan’s absence from the international nuclear regime and what implications it holds for
international assistance for their nuclear program.
Although the background was extensive, it was only provided as a springboard for students to
start their research. Ten research and preparation questions were posed to all delegates. These
questions directed the students down certain research and analysis paths on which to write their
position papers and prepare their simulation remarks. Following the research and preparation
questions is an “Important Documents” section which outlines key resources that all students
may engage in, in preparation for the debate.
These materials are integral to the success of the simulation. They provide students a starting
point for their research. The role explanation portion helps ease the burden of stepping into
someone else’s shoes without guidance. If the delegates do not have proper direction before the
start of the simulation, the benefits of the simulation will be severely limited.
Position Paper
The primary reasoning behind such in-depth preparatory support is to position the students to
write the best position paper possible. A position paper is a 3-5 page document outlining a
country’s perspective on the topic. Each delegate (whether paired or not) has to write his/her own
paper. The paper forces delegates to research their role’s history with the issue or the states
involved and extrapolate how their current and past foreign policies and connections will impact
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their country’s current stance on the designated topic. Ideally, the students should use this paper
to write a letter on behalf of their country (as if they were an ambassador) to the world
articulating the country’s stance and proposing solutions or suggestions on how the international
community can best approach the issue. These papers do not need to be exactly 3-5 pages, but I
have found this length thorough enough without being overwhelming. These papers can be
shared with the other committee members prior to the commencement of the simulation so
delegates can comprehend the various perspectives and goals present in the committee.
Various model United Nations conferences provide feedback to delegates on the quality of their
position paper upon arriving at the conference. I have found that the feedback is more effective
when disseminated at least a week before the session starts. This allows the delegates to make
appropriate adjustments to his/her policy and conduct further research if needed. For classroom
purposes, I used this position paper as a “draft.” Each delegate handed in his/her position paper
two weeks before the simulation and I returned comments and suggestions one week before the
simulation began. The delegates had to hand in their final copy of their position paper at the
conclusion of the simulation. They were instructed to observe the proceedings of the simulation
and use that experience as a tool to enhance the academic quality of their papers. I selected
seventeen different factors and separated them into six different categories to measure student
performance through their papers. I compared the results pre and post simulation to determine
the impact the simulation had on student progress towards achieving learning objectives.
The rubrics were drawn directly from the Association of American Colleges and Universities
(AAC&U). This national association strives to improve and advance undergraduate education
and is a well-respected resource for university officials and faculty. The six categories I chose to
measure were: creative thinking, critical thinking, problem solving, foundations for skills for
lifelong learning, inquiry and analysis, and information literacy. These are about half of the areas
the AAC&U views as imperative for a successful learning environment. The other rubrics
available were left out due to their inapplicability to this experiment. Each category has
anywhere from one to five sub-points. For each sub-point, a student can earn between zero and
four points. The total numerical value for each category is the sum of their scores on each subpoint. The total score of the papers is a sum of the totals from each category. Descriptions of
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what level of work is required to attain a certain value are listed in full detail in Appendix D. All
the rubrics used are also available in this section.
Simulation Execution
The simulation I conducted ran through four one-hour class periods which met on Monday,
Wednesday, and Friday. About 15 minutes of the first class period were used to go over the rules
of debate, and explain how the simulation worked. Traditionally, once taking roll call, the first
task in committee is to set the agenda. However, since there was only one topic on our agenda,
the discussion order was already set. The next order of business was to open a new Speaker’s
List intended for substantive debate on the first issue on the agenda. The Speaker’s List is a list
of members who wish to speak on the topic currently being discussed on the agenda. The
delegates had to motion to set the time limits for the Speaker’s List and raise their placards to be
added to the list. At this time, delegates are encouraged to read from their position papers to
inform the committee of their intentions and get comfortable with public speaking. After
delegates had addressed many of the aspects of the topic, they were encouraged to motion for
and enter into a moderated caucus. Moderated caucuses are periods of debate which typically
have a shorter speaking time, but no structured speaking list. Delegates who wish to speak during
moderated caucuses must raise their placard and be recognized from the chair. After the time for
the moderated caucus has expired, debate will return to the Speaker’s List.
A third type of debate that can occur during a simulation is an unmoderated caucus.
Unmoderated caucuses are time periods which allow delegates to get up and meet with members
sharing similar or divergent opinions on the topic. During this time period, delegates can begin
drafting sets of ideas on how to solve the issue and form blocs. Votes on procedural matters,
such as unmoderated or moderated caucuses, are procedural matters and require a simple
majority vote with any abstentions being prohibited.
The goal of this simulation was to produce well-written, comprehensive resolutions to the issues
at hand. Resolutions are the Security Council’s way of passing laws or suggestions to the
international community. If an informal setting is desired, or different committee structures want
to be employed, these resolutions can be turned into Action Plans which will allow delegates to
vote on how to respond to the topic without undergoing the formal and rigid structure of the
United Nations. Through formal and informal debate, delegates begin this resolution writing
- 14 -

process by creating a working paper, which is essentially a collection of ideas on possible
solutions. Once the dais accepts the working paper, it becomes a draft resolution and may be
edited, withdrawn, or merged with another draft resolution at any time prior to formal voting
procedure. When the dais accepts a motion to close debate, or the Speaker’s List is exhausted,
the committee moves into voting procedure on the draft resolutions. During this time, veto power
for the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council (U.S., France, U.K., China, and
Russia) is active and abstentions are permitted. The final resolution is passed by a simple
majority, however, if one or more of the P-5 votes negatively on the resolution it automatically
does not pass.
Debriefing Session
After voting on the resolutions in the beginning of the fifth session, the simulation class
underwent a debriefing session. An instructor led session following the conclusion of debate
allows the various events of the simulation to be placed into context. Debriefings are key to
guiding student understanding of what occurred at the surface; they also probe for subtle or less
visible impacts. This session is a great opportunity for students to connect the dots of their
learning experience—essentially rounding out a story which can be more easily retained.
For this component of the simulation, I drew from established processes on how to best conduct
a debriefing session. This structure lists the following rationale for debriefing the simulation
experience: 1) to answer student questions; 2) to sort out and clarify student thinking; 3) to
reinforce specific teaching points; 4) to link the simulation to “real life;” and, 5) to release
emotional tension that has been built during the exercise. (Fritzsche, Leonard, Boscia, Anderson;
2004:337). The research presented in “Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential
Learning” presents five to seven questions in each objective category and I selected seven
questions, in total, due to time constraints during the debriefing session. Some questions were
slightly altered to be asked in the positive. The following questions were asked to the class; those
marked with an * were drawn directly from the previously mentioned paper.
1. How did you feel about participating in the simulation?*
2. Why was this a worthwhile activity in terms of learning? Enjoyable?*
3. What personal long-term effects do you think you may have gained from this
experience?*
- 15 -

4. What problems did you encounter in making decisions as a result of your previous
decisions?*
5. What did you learn that was new to you during this simulation? (Consider what you
learned about working together in a group, course objectives, the real world.)*
6. Describe this simulations connections to (is it part of) a much larger situation (company,
industry, country, world).*
7. What are some of the decisions you made that have not been tried in the real world? Why
do you think that is so?*
8. Tell me one skill you learned/developed during this simulation.
9. Did your perspectives on the issue of Terrorism in Pakistan change?
Assessment Mechanisms
There are four key assessment mechanisms within my project. Two measures have already been
discussed, the debriefing session and the position papers. Their results will be elaborated upon
during the analysis section. The two remaining assessment mechanisms are the pre and post
simulation quizzes and the in-class observatory measures.
In addition to measuring the analytical capabilities through the position papers, I wanted to
measure simple knowledge retention. I developed two quizzes, one on various aspects of
Pakistan and one on the United Nations. These quizzes (in Appendix E) pose simple questions
such as “What is the Capital of Pakistan?” and “Pakistan is an Islamic state: True or False” or
“How many members of the Security Council have veto power and what are they?” and “The
United States is the largest contributor of Peacekeepers to the UN: True or False.” These quizzes
were designed to cover basic facts, and were not specifically tailored to the simulation. Nor did
the lecture in the control group purposely cover all aspects of the quizzes.
The quizzes were distributed to each member in class one week before the simulation started. All
quizzes were collected and scored for both classes. One week following the end of the
simulation, the exact same quiz was redistributed to both classes to measure improvement. The
scores were averaged for each topic and then added together. The difference reflected between
the beginning and ending scores marks the average change between the pre and post quiz of the
class.
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During the simulation, I observed and recorded students’ progress in public speaking and the
simulation’s achievement of Kolb’s four learning phases. Student capacity to participate in the
simulation was recorded in full. After taking pages of notes from the class discussion, I went
back through my comments and conducted a grounded theory analysis to qualify the
development made by the class. As a measurement of completing Kolb’s learning stages, I drew
upon explanations of the goals of each phase and the signs that occurred. While in class, I
recorded when a student or groups of students achieved the benchmarks.
Control Group
As mentioned, to compare the progress made as a result of the model United Nations simulation,
a controlled class was utilized. Before the start of the simulation the control class (Class B) had
the same lectures, readings, and assignments as the class with the simulation class (Class A).
Class B also took the pre and post quizzes on the same days as Class A. Students in Class B were
assigned a country using the same procedure and were provided with all of the same preparatory
information and lectures. The students in Class B also wrote a position paper as if they were
going to participate in a simulation. When the simulation started, Class B was lectured by their
professor on the United Nations for two days, the situation in Pakistan for one day, and one day
on current international topics. This class was assigned the following readings to provide
introductions on the purpose of the United Nations and to examine some of the issues facing
Pakistan.
Annan, Kofi. “ ‘In Larger Freedom’: Decision Time at the UN.” Foreign Affairs.
May/June 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 3, P63-74.
“Does the United Nations Deserve Support?”
Fortin, Jason. “Terrorism in Pakistan.” 2010.
Helms, Jesse “Saving the U.N.” Foreign Affairs. 2004, Vol. 75, Issue 5.
Karen Mingst, Essentials of International Relations, 5th edition ISBN 978-0-39393529-5, pp. 181-201; 362-70
Snow, Donald. Cases in International Relations. “Failed and Failing States.” 5th
edition ISBN 978-0-205-00582-6.
“Wrestling for Influence” The Economist, Jul 3rd, 2008
http://www.economist.com/node/11664289.

- 17 -

Because Class B did not have a simulation to draw upon for the final version of their paper, they
were encouraged to draw from class lectures and their assigned readings. Both Class A and Class
B had to turn in their papers on the same days.

- 18 -

ANALYSIS
Overview
My results exhibit that simulation based learning performs better against conventional teaching
methods. The assessment of position papers show that students participating in a simulation
exercise outperform similar students in traditional lecture classes in the following areas: creative
thinking, critical thinking, problem solving, developing foundations for lifelong learning,
analyzing situations, and showcasing improved information literacy. Analysis based on in-class
measurements and observations indicates that students made advancements in all four areas of
Kolb’s model as well as acquired new skills sets. The debriefing session suggests that students
felt they learned more and enjoyed the simulation much more than a traditional class. Plus, the
pre and post quizzes indicate that the simulation students experienced a net-gain in basic
knowledge relative to the control group.
Paper Assessment
As the table on the next illustrates, the students in the simulation class experienced a 58.46%
increase in their overall score on their position papers. Students in the control group had an
increase of 23.90%, which results in a net increase of 34.55% of the simulation class over the
control group. Grades were assigned to each position paper submitted before and after the
simulation or class lectures based on the grading rubric in Appendix D. The grades for each class
of papers were averaged, and from that average the percent increase was calculated. Each class
had 36 students, which meant 72 position papers were examined twice. Some papers were left
out of the examination process if the second one was unchanged. If they were included they
would not have impacted the final results, so they were passed over in the scoring process.
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Pre-Sim Avg
Post-Sim Avg
30.30
48.01
Simulation Papers
58.46%
Percentage Increase

Grade Areas
Creative Thinking
Critical Thinking
Problem Solving
Foundations
Inquiry/Analysis
Information Literacy

Pre-Sim Avg
4.63
3.71
8.66
5.50
5.46
2.33

Total vs
Control
34.55%

Percent
Vs.
Post-Sim Avg
Increase
Control
28.71%
8.42
81.74%
6.06
63.21%
40.21%
13.72
58.38%
32.98%
8.19
48.95%
34.86%
39.08%
8.81
61.27%
17.70%
2.81
20.66%

Impressive gains were noted particularly in the categories of critical thinking and
inquiry/analysis. The critical thinking section measured student performance on their ability to
craft an imaginative and specific position which was logical and reflected the students informed
evaluation. The Inquiry/Analysis rubric measured whether the student evidence was organized
and synthesized to generate a logically extrapolated conclusion from the inquiry findings as well
as insightfully discussed limitations and implications. These gains in the simulation class can be
explained by the nature of the simulation itself. Simulation based learning calls upon students to
digest existing information and produce a valuable conclusion from their background knowledge.
They then must act upon their conclusion, within the realm of reason, and discuss its
applicability with other delegates.
The consistency and magnitude of these gains exhibits the benefits of incorporating simulation
based learning into a classroom experience. Simulations, such as the model UN, encourage
students to not only learn the material, but apply it in a real world context, and generate new
paths from which one can approach the problem. As a result, students have to take risks, and
often experience challenges from the situation and their peers. This process persuades them to
approach creatively various issues and in turn develop problem solving skills. Further, success in
a simulation requires an insightful and critical thinker. Students not only become masters of the
original material, but discover its meaning, its shortcomings, and its potential importance in the
discussion at hand. Consequently, students dive deeper in the substance, engage different
perspectives, and grow much more than they would have under the conventional model.
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In-class Measurements and Observations
There are two core components in this section of assessment: in-class observations and progress
towards completing Kolb’s Learning Style Model. My in-class observations will provide
constructive commentary on the debate process, development, and notable achievements by
various students. The second portion will break down and evaluate how the simulation achieved
the four different learning phases of Kolb’s model and how these achievements differed, both
positively and negatively, from the traditional lecture format.
Two related skills which developed during the simulation were speaking confidence and
speaking ability. Speaking capability during a model United Nations simulation encompasses a
portfolio of more specific, yet integral abilities. When a delegate speaks during the simulation,
he/she is offering his/her country’s perspective on the current debate. Delegates prepare
speeches, offer commentary on the spot, respond to questions posed by other representatives, and
publically respond to criticism. Conveying their position integrates diplomacy, varying levels of
argumentation, clear and concise articulation, and on the sport decision making. At the outset,
students struggled with on the spot speaking and were extremely uncomfortable with diplomatic
speech. They hesitated with making decisions without having confirmed research expressing a
specific viewpoint. Lastly, they shied away from responding to critical questions of their policy
or negative comments towards their policy positions or proposed solutions.
Throughout the debate, their speaking capabilities improved, slowly at first, and rapidly towards
the end. In order for them to gain confidence in their abilities or take risks, they had to observe
others wandering into uncertain territory. Articulating the complexities of international relations
is not a one step process; it is more a development cycle. For example, one delegate struggled to
read her prepared speech during the second session, but by closing she was eloquently defending
her country’s stance on the CTBT. Grounded and accurate comments on international policy
proposals enhance the learning environment for the entire classroom. Once the simulation
develops, delegates are persuaded by their peers to view the situation from multiple perspectives.
This creates an incredibly valuable climate for students to process the complex realities of an
international situation through a variety of lenses. Each student is forced to contemplate more
than one perspective and more than one idea. These issues must then be internally weighted
before voicing his or her opinion. In essence, the challenge of global policy is vibrantly
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displayed while diving into the topic, encouraging students to put facts into perspective, and
calling upon them to analyze the various facets of the global community.
This comprehensive discussion-oriented environment is certainly ideal, especially when viewed
in comparison to no participation. In this simulation every student spoke multiple times. At the
beginning of the simulation, students were forced onto the Speaker’s List, but well into the
second and third session, there was not enough room on the board to contain a list of eager
speakers. Speeches became more articulate, analytical, and creative. As the simulation
progressed, more students gained the confidence to accept questions or comments on their
statements. Students also used the unmoderated caucuses to develop teams and construct their
comments and proposals in a way that reflected a cohesive unit with a developed strategy and
strong objectives. This progress allowed them to sift out the important topics of the debate and
address the details of related components. The conversation shifted from “we can give aid” to
“we would like to propose this type of aid from this organization for this purpose with these
conditions to achieve these goals.” As a result, their resolutions became more measurable,
actionable, and integrative.
Kolb’s Experiential Learning Model has been widely praised for its validity and reliability. Its
origins have served as the framework for extensive follow-up research in educational settings. Its
concepts are particularly applicable to simulation based learning. His model divides the learning
process into four stages: concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization,
and active experimentation (Smith and Kolb 1985). Concrete experiences are noted as providing
the framework for the learning process and require students to be flexible and open minded
because they “engage the individual personally.” The model United Nations simulation fulfills
these objectives almost immediately. Each student is assigned a different role to play and by
having a unique perspective is intimately engaged with the situation. The interactive nature
makes their involvement more fun, and allows them to relate their academic learning to the real
world, allowing their appreciation to grow. This simulation provided students with a background
guide which covered numerous topics—all of which could not be addressed during debate.
Students were able to identify with which topics they deemed were most important. Yet, as
happens in the real world, each student cannot directly control the direction of the committee, it
moves as a cohesive unit. This movement requires flexibility from the students in regards to
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which aspects will be discussed. Moreover, because each student’s perspective is different from
the start, progressive movement towards a solution obliges tolerance for opposing views and a
non-judgmental attitude toward different proposals.
The second stage of Kolb’s cycle is reflective observation, which is imperative for making sense
of the experience. This aspect was captured during the debriefing session following the end of
the simulation. It is important to note that many other scholars have argued debriefings are
critical components of any simulation experience (Steinwachs 1992; Smith and Boyer 1996;
Cusimano 2000; Petranek 2000; Hertel and Millis 2002; Markulis and Strang 2003; Zeff 2003;
Fritzsche, Leonard, Boscia and Anderson 2004; Switkey 2004; Asal 2005). During the
debriefing, as outlined later, students describe what happened in the simulation, explain their
perceptions, and contemplate how the course of events impacted their learning. This session also
gives students the opportunity to share with their classmates what they found most valuable.
Such an experience is effective because, instead of the instructor telling students what they
should have learned, classmates have the opportunity to reflect through lenses of their peers. This
is particularly important because it allows students to digress from the sometimes hectic nature
of the debate and contextualize the events.
Kolb’s third stage, abstract conceptualization, is achieved before, during, and following the
simulation. The Background Guide presents the theories and challenges of the international
discussion, aspects which the students must process and weigh while writing their pre-position
paper. During the simulation, students experience how abstract international theories play out in
the global community. For example, the concept of sovereignty can be discussed and challenged
in their position paper, but interacting with this principle in a real-life simulation grants the
student a new perspective on the uses and limits of such a principle. The role of the instructor is
paramount to ensure students progress through this stage. The instructor must moderate debate to
guide students to use logic and ideas as opposed to feelings to understand the debate and
problems posed. Lastly, the debriefing session allows the instructor to pose questions on how the
simulation helped students interact with some of the abstract components of the international
system and how the world could best improve this process.
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The final stage, active experimentation, reaches to the heart of the simulation and the pre and
post-simulation position paper. While writing their papers and preparing for the simulation,
students interact with the concepts of international relations. Participating in the simulation
allows them to act out their thoughts, test the concepts they previously researched, and develop
ways to respond to international issues. The background readings educate the students on the
issues at play, while their personal research outlines historical efforts as well as their country’s
perspective. The simulation gives each student a platform to test actions, and view how his/her
predictions on global response or cooperation over said action would unfold. Finally, students
can use their preparation and in-class negotiation to devise creatively new strategies to address
global problems. During this simulation, students modified and created international committees
to fill gaps they perceived in the UN’s ability to support counter-terrorism efforts.
Lastly, the simulation teaches students how to fail. Although this may seem contradictory to the
common goal of empowering students, it is just as important a lesson to learn. Understanding
failure and why it occurs gives students deeper insight into how to resolve global problems, and
the conditions under which success can be achieved (Sasley 2010). The resolution which was
voted on (six were proposed, but only one could be voted on due to time constraints) failed by
veto of the United States and France. This was a sorrowful defeat to the sponsors of the paper
because the vast majority of the committee supported the resolution. Students were frustrated
that the U.S. vetoed over a seemingly minute portion of the resolution. However, this served as a
perfect example of the complexity in world affairs, especially the political impact. Simulations
are a good way to teach students about failures, and how to learn from them, because they allow
students to go through the learning process on their own. From this, students can learn to develop
paths on how to avoid failure, and also understand that not all problems are solvable. Sasley
argues that understanding failure is important because
“To reach some agreed-upon outcome students might have to—in the context of
their specific groups and roles—compromise on their entrenched ideas and
values. This clashes with some of the most deeply held cultural values in
American society, one that outside observers from de Tocqueville to Einstein
have referred to: ‘that with enough determination individuals can achieve
whatever they set out to.’ ” (Sasley 2010:64)
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Yet, foreign policy is not simple, and America’s hegemony is decreasing—especially with the
rise of China. Disagreements over foreign policy are likely to occur because countries utilize
different decision making processes. As the world becomes a more globalized and connected
playing field, a heighted comprehension of how individuals from different backgrounds will
make foreign policy decisions is crucial to individual, organizational, and governmental success.
Debriefing Session
During the debriefing session, I asked nine different questions over a 40 minute period to the
simulation class. These questions focused on aspects of the simulation and how it had impacted
their learning experience. Out of the 31 students present for the debriefing session, 26 stated their
opinions about terrorism, Pakistan, and the UN had changed. Multiple students stated that the
simulation had changed the way they thought about international affairs. They enjoyed being
placed in a different country’s shoes and hearing a variety of perspectives about an issue. From
these different perspectives, conflict and disagreement naturally arose. Learning how to manage
conflict, diplomatically disagree with another country’s perspective, and negotiate for a common
agenda were also challenges they faced. Understanding the different perspectives forced the
students to make arguments that knowingly would turn people against them.
One student acknowledged that the simulation was a “more interesting, different way to learn.
The simulation was more interactive, and better than a lecture. I felt more into it, as opposed to
getting talked at.” Students believed, “It was a memorable activity and experience” and the
simulation was “a lot of fun.” This level of enjoyment is crucial when discussing international
affairs topics because the issues are not cut and dry. Students noted that the enjoyable
environment motivated them to work harder and made it easier to process information beyond
face value. Another student noted that the simulation taught him how to take simple facts and
standard information and process what it means and discover how to respond to any given
situation. These critical thinking skills cannot simply be developed in a classroom lecture setting.
Participants commented that their experience pushed them to “analyze an issue more than I
would have” in order to take the next best step. For example, multiple students discussed the
realities of international cooperation in regards to aid. The simulation forced them to witness
personally that there is no simple solution to issues surrounding terrorism, and that providing aid
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to suppress terrorism is a process much more complicated than portrayed in the readings or
media.
Students frequently commented about the U.N. system and some of its impracticalities for
handling international issues. One student noted the institutional mechanics are not efficient, and
granting veto power to SC members seriously hinders global cooperation. However, the order of
the SC rules of procedure and equal speaking time given to smaller countries allowed them to
gain a more global perspective. A few students noted their frustration with U.S. foreign policy
and the roadblocks it presents to some international issues, such as nuclear proliferation. During
the simulation, students worked tirelessly to have Pakistan and India sign the Non Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Pakistan agreed to sign the NPT if India signed, and India agreed if the US would
sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This proposal was flatly rejected by the
United States delegates, which seriously set back the discussion on Pakistan’s nuclear program.
Through these experiences, delegates became acutely aware of the power politics in the
international arena. They noted that they found themselves leading and following other’s leads at
different points in the simulation. Some expressed frustration at having no influence over the
discussion, while others noted how easy it was to manipulate debate to reach their goals.
Participants discussed how difficult it was to step into someone else’s shoes at the beginning of
the simulation. They struggled to articulate an opinion which they did not agree with, and had
difficulty representing a country without a slew of background research. As the simulation
progressed, they became more comfortable with thinking critically from a different perspective.
Some countries did not have publicized or easily accessible positions on terrorism in Pakistan—
such as Guatemala or Togo. These students had to learn how to take various strands of
information and piece them together into a policy that made sense. Many students commented
that this process of creative thinking and knowledge generation, as opposed to reiteration,
became easier as the simulation progressed.
Students also addressed the social skills they developed throughout the debate. Public speaking,
fielding pointed questions, and negotiation topped the list. They noted that they learned how to
become more cooperative and patient, especially when working with individuals who held points
of view completely divergent from their own. The fast paced nature of the simulation forced
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them to think on their feet and independently assess where other members stood on an issue. One
delegate noted that she had a problem choosing which relationships to develop and which sides
to take. Another student concluded that this experience forced him to set his personal opinions
aside and look at the topics from a more analytical and critical perspective. As a result, he found
himself consistently asking why, what, or how, as opposed to just settling into an opinion.
Pre and Post Quiz Results
As previously iterated, the quizzes assessed simple information retention. Two quizzes were
administered to each class, one before the simulation (and lecture) period and one after. Their
scores between the two classes were compared. The chart below illustrates the results.

Quiz Results (Knowledge Retention)
UN
Pre
5.952

Simulation Mean

Pakistan
Pre
3.290

Simulation Change
Control Group Mean

5.323

Control Group Change
Change over Control Group

Total Change over Control
Group

3.806

UN
Post

Pakistan
Post

8.681

3.783

45.85%

14.98%

8.261

3.788

55.20%

-0.49%

-9.35%

15.47%

6.13%

The class which underwent the simulation experienced a 3.61% increase in total knowledge
retention, while the control group actually decreased -0.17%. Although this is a small increase,
there are a few important conclusions that can be drawn. Firstly, the simulation appears to have
been effective, in fact more effective, in communicating simple facts and figures. This is integral
because information was not directly ‘taught’ to the class in the common use of the word; it was
shared through the class. Secondly, the simulation did not cover all topics or details on the quiz,
while the control group did. Traditionally, scholars note that simulations are limited because the
topic engagement is somewhat uncontrolled. While accurate, because the simulation should run
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itself without instructor interference, these results suggest that knowledge retention actually
improved over lectures where specific facts and theories could be directly addressed. As a result,
either the students learned the topic outside of the classroom through their own independent or
group research, or the information covered during the simulation was retained at a higher
percentage than the information covered in the lecture. This higher retention rate would impact
the results because retaining 80% of 50% of the material—50% being what is covered—is larger
than retaining 30% if all material is covered.
These conclusions are particularly insightful because active learning literature already proves
that simulations play a much larger role than learning retention. As a result, this portion of the
analysis concludes that the simulation exceeded the simple goals of lecture style teaching before
the more important impacts of simulation based learning were even measured. Their results
indicate that students also advanced in basic knowledge in addition to previously outlined
impact.
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CONCLUSION
Use of a Model United Nations Simulation in a Classroom
Bearing in mind the success of this experiment, the question arises “how can MUN (or another
type of simulation) be integrated into a classroom?” First, a simulation should complement and
not completely replace a curriculum. Second, there are a few logistical points such as duration
and topic selection an instructor should bear in mind. Lastly, simulations need to be well thought
out exercises in order for their true potential to be achieved. Successful adoption and integration
of the following points will render a positive learning environment and maximize the benefits of
experiential learning.
Simulations can play an integral part in the learning experience, but their placement within a
developed curriculum is extremely important. Foundational knowledge of international systems,
theories, and certain situations can critically ameliorate the simulation experience. Students with
in-depth background knowledge about the functional practices of the international community
can easily adapt to the mechanics of the simulation, thus allowing them to focus their time on the
substance at hand. For example, the quality of the debate and discussion visibly improved once
the students managed to overcome the knowledge gap on how the UN works. Furthermore,
increased understanding of the abilities and different organizations of the international
community will enhance the capacity of students to utilize knowingly the global structure to
solve various problems. Therefore, it is important to position the simulation after some
knowledge has been developed. I would also suggest that the simulation not be placed towards
the end of the course, but in the middle. This way the skills students develop during the
simulation can serve as a framework for their performance throughout the remainder of the
course.
Second, instructors should pay careful attention to the logistics of the simulation. Simulations
should try to last two to three (six or more classes) weeks in duration. Although my simulation
ran about one and-a-half weeks, it would have been more beneficial if it could have run longer.
The first session is normally used to familiarize students with the debate procedure and introduce
a few perspectives on the topic. During the second session all positions will be presented and
students will start to dig into some of the sub topics. Sessions three and four will be primarily
used for intense substantive debate, bloc formulation, and resolution writing. Session five should
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be reserved for voting, while session six should be used as a debriefing session. If instructors
have the flexibility to expand the middle portion (session three and four to sessions three through
six) the quality of the ideas, resolutions, and diplomatic negotiation will greatly improve. Some
scholars have noted that fewer longer sessions can be more beneficial than multiple short
sessions. I agree with this perspective because in a longer session, delegates have time to step
into their roles and fully engage a topic—a short session runs the risk of cutting debate off during
the height of idea formulation. Additionally, this simulation is more conducive for a smaller class
size. Unless an abundance of time is present, a simulation should not be run with more than 40
students. In a class of up to 40, students can be paired up to make 20 delegations. Any more
delegations would result in too much time being spent on hearing all perspectives and opinions.
As a result, the more delegations, the less each delegate gets to speak, and the less interactive and
beneficial the simulation.
Moreover, some scholars have debated what course level is most conducive for hosting a
simulation. I contend that simulations can be conducted in every level of IR courses, as long as
the appropriate preparation materials are required. The lower-level courses should be provided
with more preparation materials and overview of the UN and other international systems. The
topic should also vary by level. Introductory courses should not partake in a narrowly focused
debate (such as the Western Sahara or the Nagorno-Karakbah conflict) but can engage wider
encompassing issues, i.e., Colombian FARC or the Israeli-Palestine issue. More advanced
courses can venture outside the traditional UN structure and simulate State Cabinets, councils,
and other specialized agencies. Ideally, the instructor should choose a topic which touches on
various aspects of international affairs he/she wishes to highlight. For example, a topic such as
the situation in Pakistan examines the issues of foreign aid, international and humanitarian
intervention, nuclear weapons safety, and terrorism. In the end it is important to remember that
MUN simulations advance student skill sets, a process which is beneficial and crucial at any
level. Regardless of the topic, its selection should serve as a tool to achieve specified learning
objectives, and should not be random.
Suggestions for Future Simulations
For instructors wishing to incorporate a simulation into their classroom, I have provided a few
suggestions below. These ideas are by no means mandatory, but they have the ability to enhance
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greatly the learning experience. First, I suggest that professors provide a background guide to all
delegates. This Background Guide should provide an overview of the committee history,
mechanics of the simulation, outline the history of the topic, and include current status updates,
role descriptions, and ask questions to guide the focus of student research. Although these BGs
are not easy to produce, lecturers should look into using BGs from established MUN
conferences. Professors should also provide a detailed explanation of the position paper
assignment. If this aspect is not thoroughly covered, students may enter the debate under false
presumptions or with less than adequate background knowledge.
Instructors should also explicitly explain the learning objectives of the simulation. Students who
better understand the goal and purpose of the simulation can draw more from the role-playing
atmosphere. At the outset of the simulation, students were unsure about which steps to take or
how the process would work. A more extensive explanation process on the reason and structure
of the simulation would allow delegates to dive into debate. I suggest that the individual
coordinating the simulation set up office hours to help students prepare or more actively
participate during the simulation. A 10 minute meeting with each delegation prior to the
simulation would ensure each country was following the appropriate perspective and that
students were prepared and energized for debate. If key countries, such as any of the P-5 or a
country directly affected by the topic is inadequately prepared, the quality of the debate will be
tampered. At the start of the debate, each delegate should be provided a list of perambulatory and
operative clauses so they spend less time on the technicalities of the UN language. Providing a
sample resolution to the committee can help delegates better understand how the UN responds to
international quagmires and simultaneously gives them a template for their own work.
Incorporating different information technology infrastructure can also enhance the quality of the
debate. For example, having an assistant with digital chat capabilities allows students to ask factbased questions (such as, “How many drone attacks in Pakistan were there last year?”) and
receive almost instant feedback. This information exchange can expand the limits of standard
debate. Students can also request access to different documents, such as treaties or press releases
they may want to reference in the committee. This chat option can also be expanded to allow
students to discuss options with their bloc members—discussions which would have to be
monitored. I suggest utilizing a tool such as Respondus Lockdown Browser to prevent students
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from misusing the technology to access Facebook, Twitter, YouTube etc. The instructor would
have to ensure students were not substituting the in-class discussion with the chat-based tool, but
using it as an additional source to achieve their desired results.
Value of a Model United Nations Simulation
These results tell us that a model United Nations simulation has a substantial impact on the way
students think and learn in the field of international relations studies. Simulation based learning
is a mechanism to encourage education to focus on self-generated learning. The benefits of such
an exercise are worth the time and effort. Simulation based learning is a more effective method
to increase student’s creative and critical thinking, analytical and problem solving capabilities,
and comprehension of complex and diverse topics. This type of learning is more fun and
interactive which helps students not only engage the substance, but it contributes to their own
education. This high level of in-class participation also develops strong social and speaking
skills. Moreover, simulations, if crafted and executed correctly, can lead a student through all
four phases of Kolb’s learning model. Students who undergo simulations comment that the
process helps them view problems through an ameliorated, more advanced, and more thorough
lens. With this perspective, students are better equipped to assume their role as global citizens
and leaders. Finally, these learning objectives can be accomplished without expensing retention
of basic information—in fact, their retention rates improve because students interact with
information as opposed to viewing it. Simulation based learning should be seriously considered
by members of the higher education community and incorporated into various curricula to
maximize a students learning process.
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APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX B
NHSMUN Rules of Procedure
Rule 1 — Date of Meeting
The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council shall meet every year in regular session.
-----------------Rule 2 — Emergency Session
Emergency sessions invoked under General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) shall be immediately
convened upon the request of the Secretary-General.
Comment — General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V), known as the "Uniting for Peace Resolution,"
allows the Security Council, in the event of a veto, to refer an issue to the General Assembly Plenary.
Such a motion requires the affirmative vote of seven (7) Members and is not subject to a veto. Security
Council powers such as mandatory sanctions or military action may not be exercised by the General
Assembly. Any General Assembly resolutions voted upon under this procedure require a two-thirds
majority for passage.
-----------------Rule 3 — Emergency Special Session; Agenda
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule and unless the General Assembly decides otherwise, the
Assembly, in the case of an emergency special session, shall convene to discuss only the item under
consideration.
-----------------Rule 4 — Delegations
The delegation of a Member State shall consist of no more than two representatives in any committee.
Comment — Regardless of the number of representatives, a Member State has only one vote in each
committee in which it is a member.
-----------------Rule 5 — Credentials
The credentials and the names of representatives of Member States shall be submitted to the SecretaryGeneral if possible not later than one week before the opening of the session.
-----------------Rule 6 — Credentials Committee
The Credentials Committee shall be composed of a representative of each of those Member States elected
to serve on the Credentials Committee of the current session of the General Assembly. It shall examine
the credentials of representatives and report without delay.
Comment — The Credentials Committee is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all
representatives seated at the United Nations are in fact representative of the people of that nation. The
credentials of any representative may be referred to the Credentials Committee, which meets at the end of
the last regular committee session. The Credentials Committee will submit its recommendation, in
resolution form, to the General Assembly Plenary for its decision. The Credentials Committee of the
conference shall be composed of the same nations as the Credentials Committee of the current session of
the United Nations.
-----------------Rule 7 — Provisional Admission to a Session
Any representative to whose admission a Member has made objection shall be seated provisionally with
the same rights as other representatives until the Credentials Committee has reported and the General
Assembly has rendered a decision on the matter.
-----------------Rule 8 — General Committee; Composition
The General Committee shall be composed of a representative of each of those Member States which
have been elected to serve as the President of the General Assembly or the Vice-President or the
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Chairman of a Main Committee at the current session of the General Assembly. No two Members of the
General Committee shall be representatives of the same Member State and the General Committee shall
be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.
Comment — The General Committee of the conference shall be composed of the same Member States as
the General Committee of the current session of the United Nations.
-----------------Rule 9 — General Committee; Functions
The General Committee shall convene prior to the final plenary session of the General Assembly. The
General Committee shall determine the agenda of the final plenary session. The General Committee shall
not consider the substance of any issue, and shall meet at the request of the Secretary-General.
Comment — The General Committee will order the resolutions passed by each Main Committee for the
consideration of the plenary session.
---------------Rule 10 — Duties of the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly and the
Economic and Social Council, their committees and subcommittees. The Secretary-General may
designate a member of the Secretariat to act in the place of the Secretary-General at these meetings. The
Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the General Assembly, the Economic and
Social Council, and any committees or subsidiary organs which they may establish.
Comment — The term "Secretariat" refers collectively to those designated to act on behalf of the
Secretary-General.
-----------------Rule 11 — Statements by the Secretariat
The Secretary-General, or a member of the Secretariat designated by the Secretary-General as his or her
representative, may make, at any time, either oral or written statements to any plenary meeting or any
committee or subcommittee concerning any question under consideration by it.
-----------------Rule 12 — Functions of the Chairman
The Chairman shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the committee, direct its
discussions, ensure observance of the rules of procedure, accord the right to speak, put questions and
announce decisions. The Chairman shall rule on points of order and, subject to these rules, shall have
complete control of the proceedings at any meeting and over the maintenance of order thereat. The
Chairman may, in the course of the discussion of an item, propose to the committee the limitation of the
time to be allowed to speakers, the closure of the list of speakers, or the closure of the debate. The
Chairman may also propose the suspension or adjournment of the meeting or the adjournment of debate
on the item under discussion.
Comment — The Chairman shall have discretionary powers to entertain a motion, or suggest to the body
that a motion would be in order, or choose not to entertain a motion and suggest that it be withdrawn. The
Chairman may rule a motion out of order, thus disallowing that motion.
-----------------Rule 13 — Invitation to Silent Prayer or Meditation
Immediately after the opening of the first plenary meeting and immediately preceding the closing of the
final plenary meeting of each session of the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council, the
Chairman shall invite representatives to observe a moment of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.
-----------------Rule 14 — Establishment of Committees and Subcommittees
The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council may establish such committees as they
deem necessary for the performance of their functions. Each committee may set up subcommittees.
-----------------Rule 15 — Notification Under Article 12 of the Charter
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The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly, at
each session, of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are
under consideration by the Security Council, and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the
Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately when the Security
Council ceases to consider such matters.
Comment — Technically the General Assembly is not permitted to discuss or vote on an issue that is
under consideration by the Security Council. However, in practice, the General Assembly both discusses
and votes on different aspects of issues before the Security Council.
-----------------Rule 16 — Provisional Agenda
The Provisional Agenda for a regular session of all committees and organs of the United Nations shall be
drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the United Nations at least sixty
(60) days before the opening of the session.
Comment — The Provisional Agenda is the topic list provided by the Directors of the committees. The
order of the topics does not imply the order of the agenda.
-----------------Rule 17 — Adoption of the Agenda
Each committee shall order the provisional agenda provided by the Secretary-General. A proposed agenda
shall include all topics provided in the provisional agenda. It requires a simple majority to approve an
agenda order and proposed agendas shall be voted upon in the order in which they were proposed.
Comment — The first item of business for each committee will be to order its agenda. A speakers list will
be established for purposes of discussing the order of the agenda. After a sufficient number of speakers
have spoken on the order of the agenda, a Member may move, from the floor, that a particular agenda
order be adopted. If properly moved, an immediate procedural vote will be conducted. If the proposed
agenda passes, debate on the order of the agenda will be deemed to have been closed, the speakers list
will be discarded, and the committee will begin consideration of the first agenda topic. If the proposed
agenda fails, the committee will continue debate, using the same speakers list, until another order is
proposed. If a proposed agenda fails, it may be reintroduced at a later time.
-----------------Rule 18 — Change of Agenda
A committee may change the order in which it considers agenda topics. The Chairman may entertain one
speaker for, and one against, a motion to change the order. A simple majority vote is required to change
the order in which agenda topics will be discussed.
Comment — A motion to change the order of the agenda may only be moved after a substantive topic has
been closed and all related resolutions and amendments have been put to a vote. A motion to change the
agenda may not be moved during the substantive debate of any topic.
-----------------Rule 19 — Quorum
The Chairman may declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed or a procedural vote to be
taken when at least one-quarter of the members of the committee are present. The presence of a majority
of the members of the committee shall be required for any substantive decision to be taken.
Comment — Procedural votes refer to motions regarding the process of the discussion (e.g. a motion for
recess, or closure of the speakers list). Substantive votes address the substance of the topic under
discussion (e.g. a vote on the contents of a resolution or amendment).
-----------------Rule 20 — Speeches
No Member may address a committee without having previously obtained the permission of the
Chairman. The Chairman shall take a speakers list in the order in which the Members signify their desire
to speak. The Chairman shall call a speaker to order if the speaker's remarks are not relevant to the subject
under discussion.
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Comment — Members may speak as often as they wish, however, Members must wait until they have
already spoken before being placed on the speakers list again.
-----------------Rule 21 — Language and Interpretation
English shall be the official and the working language of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social
Council, and their committees and subcommittees. Any Member may make a speech in any language
other than the official language. In this case, the Member shall provide for simultaneous interpretation
into the official language.
Comment — The time required for translation and the original speech shall both be counted against the
speaker's time.
-----------------Rule 22 — Time Limit on Speeches
The Chairman may, upon consultation with the committee or as a result of a motion by a member of the
committee, limit the time allowed to each speaker on any question. When debate is limited and a speaker
exceeds the allotted time, the Chairman shall call that speaker to order without delay.
-----------------Rule 23 — Questions to the Speaker
When the committee is engaged in substantive debate, a time limit has been placed on speeches, and the
speaker has not exhausted the allotted time, the speaker may inform the Chairman that he or she will
accept questions from the floor. At such time, the Chairman will recognize Members to pose substantive
questions to the speaker on the issue under discussion. The speaker may at any time determine that he or
she will cease accepting questions and thus conclude his or her remarks.
Comment — A Member may only rise to pose questions to the speaker when:
a) the committee is debating a substantive issue;
b) a time limit has been placed on speeches;
c) the speaker has not exhausted his or her allotted time; and
d) the speaker has agreed to accept questions from the floor.
Questions addressed to the speaker shall relate directly to the substantive issue under discussion,
requesting elucidation or clarification of a point made or a position taken by the speaker. The Member
asking a question of the speaker may not engage the speaker in debate, but rather must phrase his or her
point in the form of a question. The speaker may at any time decide to conclude his or her remarks and
answers, notwithstanding that a question may remain unanswered. Members may want to keep their
questions brief because a speaker's time shall be measured from the point at which the speaker takes the
floor, and shall include the time used to ask a question. When a speaker's allotted time has elapsed, the
Chairman shall promptly call the speaker to order.
-----------------Rule 24 — Yields
When the time for speeches has been limited, a Member recognized to speak on a substantive issue may
yield his or her remaining time to another Member. This Member may not yield any additional time.
Comment — A representative may share her or his allotted time with another representative of the same
Member State and this shall not count as a yield. A yield may be announced at any time before the
speaker has left the floor. Yields may not be granted during procedural debate.
-----------------Rule 25 — Closing the Speakers List
The speakers list may be closed at any time upon the majority vote of the Members present and voting.
Comment — When a closed speakers list is exhausted, debate automatically ends and an immediate vote
is taken on all resolutions and amendments before the committee.
-----------------Rule 26 — Reopening the Speakers List
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The speakers list may be reopened by a vote of the Members provided that at least one speaker remains
on the list at the time of the motion. One Member may speak in favor of and one opposed to this motion.
Comment — If the motion is carried, additional Members may be added to the already existing speakers
list.
-----------------Rule 27 — Right of Reply
If a speaker has impugned the national integrity of another Member State or observer, or the personal
integrity of another representative, the Chairman may accord that Member or representative appropriate
speaking time to exercise the right of reply.
Comment — The right of reply is to be used to respond to the statements of the speaker. It may not be
used to make corresponding, insulting remarks. It is granted at the discretion of the Chairman and should
only be requested at the conclusion of the speaker's remarks.
-----------------Rule 28 — Resolutions and Amendments
Resolutions and amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Chairman who shall circulate
copies to the Members. No resolutions or amendments shall be voted upon unless copies of them have
been made available to all Members.
Comment — Any Member may submit an amendment or a resolution. Any Member may be added to the
list of sponsors of a resolution or amendment at any time before the resolution or amendment is put to a
vote. Sponsorship indicates support of and agreement with a resolution or amendment. Because of the
limited resources of the conference, it is necessary to insure a minimum level of discussion of a resolution
or amendment before it is produced for general distribution. Therefore, a resolution must have the
signatures of one-fifth of the membership of the body (but not less than five Members) and amendments
must have the signatures of one-tenth of the membership of the body (but not less than three Members). A
"signature" does not indicate sponsorship of, nor even agreement with, a resolution or amendment.
Rather, a signature is intended to mean that the Member desires the opportunity to discuss the resolution
or amendment. A less formal draft of a resolution, often referred to as a working paper, may also be
submitted to the Chairman for the purpose of making additional copies for wider distribution. Whether a
working paper is copied and how many copies are made will be determined by the Chairman.
-----------------Rule 29 — Competence
Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the committee to adopt a resolution or
amendment submitted to it shall be put to the vote before a vote is taken on the resolution or amendment
in question.
Comment — The Secretary-General has approved the competence of each committee to discuss the topic
areas included in the provisional agenda. This rule serves to prevent the exercise of powers reserved
exclusively for the Security Council by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. In
this vote, an affirmative vote indicates that the body is NOT competent to pass the proposal and vice
versa.
-----------------Rule 30 — Withdrawal
A motion, resolution, or amendment may be withdrawn by its mover or sponsor(s) at any time before
voting on the motion, resolution, or amendment has commenced. A motion, resolution, or amendment
thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any Member. A resolution may not be withdrawn after it has been
amended.
Comment — In order to withdraw a resolution or an amendment, all sponsors must agree to the
withdrawal.
-----------------Rule 31 — Point of Order
During the discussion of any matter, a Member may rise to a point of order. A point of order is used only
in the case of an error in the order of procedure and is used to bring the issue to the attention of the
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Chairman. A Member rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under
discussion.
Comment — If necessary, a point of order may interrupt a speaker.
----------------Rule 32 — Point of Parliamentary Inquiry
A Member may rise to a point of parliamentary inquiry when uncertain of the procedural setting of the
committee. A Member may not interrupt a speaker on a point of parliamentary inquiry.
Comment — Representatives may use this point to have the Chairman explain any procedural matter. A
point of parliamentary inquiry may be raised during voting procedure.
-----------------Rule 33 — Point of Personal Privilege
A Member may rise to a point of personal privilege in order to bring to the attention of the Chairman
some physical discomfort which is disrupting the proper functioning of the committee. A point of
personal privilege may interrupt a speaker.
Comment — A representative may rise to a point of personal privilege when he or she is unable to hear
the Chairman or speaker or for other physical reasons which may impair the representative's ability to
participate in or listen to the debate.
-----------------Rule 34 — Appeal
A Member may appeal a discretionary ruling of the Chairman. The Member may explain the appeal and
the Chairman may explain the basis of the ruling. The Chairman's ruling will stand unless overruled by a
majority of the Members present and voting.
Comment — Voting "yes" on this motion means a Member wishes to overrule the decision of the
Chairman. Voting "no" means the Member wishes to uphold the ruling.
-----------------Rule 35 — Recess of the Meeting
During the discussion of any matter, a Member may move to recess the meeting. Such a motion shall
include the proposed length of such recess and shall not be debated but immediately shall be put to the
vote.
Comment — Recess of the meeting is used for caucusing, meal breaks and the evening break. Normally, a
recess for the purpose of caucusing should not exceed twenty minutes. When the motion to recess is
made, the Chairman may suggest a different time period for the suspension. A simple majority is required
to pass a motion to recess.
-----------------Rule 36 — Closure of Debate
A Member may at any time move the closure of the debate on the item under consideration, whether or
not any other Member has signified his or her wish to speak. Permission to speak on the closure of the
debate shall be accorded only to two Members opposing the closure, after which the motion immediately
shall be put to the vote. If two-thirds of the committee is in favor of the closure, the Chairman shall
declare the closure of the debate.
Comment — Closure of debate is used to end discussion of a topic area. When debate is closed, the
committee must move to an immediate vote on the resolution(s) and amendment(s) under that topic area.
Motions for closure of debate are generally out of order until there has been a full discussion of the issue
by the committee. The speakers list will be discarded following passage of a motion to close debate. The
speakers list will not be carried over for other substantive or procedural debate.
-----------------Rule 37 — Adjournment of Debate
During the discussion of any matter, a Member may move the adjournment of the debate on the item
under discussion. Two Members may speak in favor of, and two against, the motion after which the
motion immediately shall be put to the vote.
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Comment — Adjournment of debate is used to end discussion of a topic area. Adjournment of debate is
sometimes referred to as "tabling" debate on the topic area. When debate is adjourned, the resolution(s)
and amendment(s) under that topic area are not voted on. A topic area which has been adjourned may
only be reconsidered in accordance with Rule 49.
-----------------Rule 38 — Adjournment of Session
The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council may each decide at any session to adjourn
temporarily and resume the meeting at a later date.
Comment — Unlike recess, adjournment is only appropriate at the final closing of committee sessions and
at the close of the conference. This is a procedural motion and requires the approval of the Chairman.
-----------------Rule 39 — Order of Procedural Motions
The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all other proposals or
motions before the committee:
a) to recess the meeting (Rule 35);
b) to adjourn the session (Rule 38);
c) to adjourn the debate on the item under discussion (Rule 37);
d) to close debate on the item under discussion (Rule 36).
-----------------Rule 40 — Voting Rights
Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote.
Comment — Observer delegations may not vote on substantive issues, but may vote on procedural
motions.
-----------------Rule 41 — Meaning of the Phrase "Members Present and Voting"
For the purposes of these rules, the phrase "Members present and voting" means Members casting an
affirmative or negative vote. Members who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.
Comment — Abstentions will not be called for in procedural votes.
-----------------Rule 42 — Simple Majority
Decisions of committees on questions other than those provided for in Rules 36, 48, and 49, including the
determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made
by a majority of the Members present and voting. If a vote is equally divided, the motion, resolution, or
amendment fails.
-----------------Rule 43 — Method of Voting
The General Assembly shall normally vote by show of placards, but any Member may request a roll-call
vote on a resolution or amendment. The roll-call shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the
names of the Members, beginning with the Member whose name is drawn by lot by the Chairman. The
name of each Member shall be called in any roll-call, and one of the Member State's representatives shall
reply "yes," "no," or "abstention." Members may pass in the order of a vote once per vote. The Chairman
may allow Members to explain their vote after a roll-call vote. The Chairman shall not permit the
sponsors of a resolution or amendment to explain their vote on their own resolution or amendment. The
result of the voting shall be inserted in the record in the English alphabetical order of the names of the
Members.
Comment — The Chairman may require that a motion for a roll-call vote be supported by as much as onefifth of the committee. While abstentions do not count as votes for purposes of determining a majority
(Rule 41), Members abstaining from a vote may request the right to explain their abstention, provided that
they were not the sponsor of the resolution or amendment. Roll-call votes may not be taken on procedural
motions.
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-----------------Rule 44 — Conduct During the Voting
After the Chairman has announced the beginning of voting, no Member shall interrupt the voting except
on a point of order in connection with the actual conduct of the voting or on a point of parliamentary
inquiry.
Comment — During a vote, representatives should maintain proper decorum; no caucusing should take
place, no notes should be passed, and no representatives should enter or leave the room.
-----------------Rule 45 — Division of Resolutions and Amendments
a) A Member may move that the operative clauses of a resolution or amendment be voted on
separately. If objection is made to the motion for division, the motion to divide shall be voted on.
This is a procedural vote. Permission to speak on the motion for division may be granted to two
speakers for and two speakers against the motion.
b) If the motion for division is carried, a substantive vote shall be taken on each of the divided parts.
c) Those parts which are approved shall then be voted on as a whole. This shall be a substantive
vote. If all operative parts of the resolution or amendment have been rejected, the resolution or
amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.
d) In the event of several motions for division, the Chairman shall order the motions, selecting that
motion which divides the resolution or amendment into the most parts first. A successful motion
for division will supersede later conflicting motions.
Comment — This action consists of three stages, one procedural and two substantive:
1) The vote on whether the resolution or amendment will be divided at all; this is a procedural vote;
2) The vote on each of the divided operative parts; these are substantive votes;
3) The final vote on all of the accepted parts as a whole; this is a substantive vote.
Pre-ambulatory clauses may not be divided. A motion for division must delineate the placement of each
operative clause. Only clauses that are distinctly specified within the resolution or amendment may be
divided.
-----------------Rule 46 — Voting on Amendments
A motion is considered an amendment to a resolution if it adds to, deletes from or revises part of the
resolution. When an amendment to a resolution is moved, the amendment shall be voted on first. When
two or more amendments to a resolution are moved, the committee shall first vote on the amendment
furthest removed in substance from the original resolution and then on the amendment next furthest
removed there from, and so on until all of the amendments have been put to a vote. Where, however, the
adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter amendment
shall not be put to a vote. If any amendments are adopted, the amended resolution shall then be voted
upon.
Comment -- Amendments will be voted upon after debate on the topic area has been closed and
immediately before the vote on the relevant resolution. Pre-ambulatory clauses may not be amended.
Technically, there are no "friendly amendments." However, if all of the sponsors of a resolution agree that
a certain change to a proposed resolution is desirable, with the concurrence of the Chairman, the sponsors
may withdraw the original resolution and submit a "new" resolution, as changed. All other amendments
must be put to a vote. The Chairman shall determine the order of voting on the amendments and when one
amendment implies the rejection of another.
-----------------Rule 47 — Voting on Resolutions
If two or more resolutions relate to the same question, the committee shall, unless it decides otherwise,
vote on the resolutions in the order in which they have been submitted. The Committee may, after each
vote on a resolution, decide whether to vote on the next resolution.
Comment — It requires a majority vote to change the order in which a committee considers resolutions.
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-----------------Rule 48 — Important Questions
Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the
Members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the
maintenance of international peace and security, the suspension of the rights and privileges of
membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and
budgetary questions. Any Member may move to consider a resolution an important question. Two
Members may speak in favor of and two against the motion. It shall require a simple majority vote to
consider a resolution as an important question.
Comment — The Chairman will not determine the existence of an important question; it requires the
initiative of the committee. Only when a resolution is in its final form may a motion be made to consider
it an important question (i.e., after voting on amendments and division is completed).
-----------------Rule 49 — Reconsideration
When a resolution has been adopted or rejected or when debate on a topic area has been adjourned, it may
not be reconsidered at the same session unless the committee, by a two-thirds majority of the Members
present and voting, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider may be accorded only to
one speaker in favor of the motion, and one opposing the motion, after which the motion immediately
shall be put to the vote.
Comment — This rule may be used to reconsider specific resolutions upon which an actual vote has been
taken or entire topic areas upon which debate was adjourned. It may not be used to reconsider entire topic
areas upon which debate was closed and a vote was taken on the resolution(s) and amendment(s). As a
practical matter, a motion to reconsider a resolution should be made only by a Member who voted with
the originally prevailing side.
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SIMULATION

As delegates serving on the Security Council, all members will have the opportunity to put forth
resolutions aimed at addressing some of the world’s most complex international issues. These
resolutions are meant to embody the work of the UN Security Council, and should reflect the
central objective of the body: to maintain global security and stability.
The five permanent members of the Security Council, known as the P-5, posses veto power on
substantive issues. The ten remaining delegations, which bring total committee membership to
fifteen, do not have veto power. Also, the Council may, from time to time, invite non-Security
council nations or organizations to members to participate in the proceedings. Such members may
only vote on procedural matters; once the committee has entered formal voting procedure on any
resolution, the invitee is not permitted to cast their vote.
In this simulation of the UN Security Council, the Director (Jason Fortin) will chair debate. The
Director and can also be referred to as the dais. The dais is charged with the task of maintaining
decorum throughout the committee session. The dais will also assist delegates in their use of
parliamentary procedure and work to ensure that all points of order are handled appropriately.
Furthermore, the Director will provide directional advice and delegates may ask the dais any
questions they have about the topics themselves and/or procedural matters.
A delegate’s first job before coming to committee is to research both topics before the committee
and to feel comfortable advocating their assigned country’s policies. It is important that even if a
delegate does not agree personally with a nation’s policies, he or she remains true to country policy,
and continues to voice these ideas to the committee, remaining cognizant of how these policies are
reflected in resolutions written during the simulation. As members on a very specialized committee,
delegates are encouraged to work together towards a viable solution, and all members are should
seek to collaborate with states whose policies and opinions on the issues similar to their own.
Traditionally, the first task in committee will be to set the agenda. However, since there is only one
topic on our Agenda, the discussion order is already set. The next order of business is to open a new
Speaker’s List intended for substantive debate on the first issue on the agenda. Debate will move in
the order of this Speaker’s List until a vote by the Council moves the discussion into either a
moderated or unmoderated caucus. Votes on procedural matters such as unmoderated or moderated
caucuses are procedural matters and will require a simple majority vote with any abstentions being
prohibited.
The goal of this simulation is to produce well-written, comprehensive resolutions to the issues at
hand. Through formal and informal debate, delegates will begin this resolution writing process by
creating a working paper, which is essentially a collection of ideas on possible solutions. Once the
dais accepts the working paper it becomes a draft resolution and may be edited, withdrawn, or
merged with another draft resolution at any time prior to formal voting procedure. When the dais
accepts a motion to close debate, or the Speaker’s List is exhausted, the committee moves into
voting procedure on the draft resolutions. During this time, veto power for the P-5 is active and
abstentions are permitted. The final resolution is passed by a simple majority, however if one or
more of the P-5 votes negatively on the resolution it automatically does not pass.
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Working on the Security Council is a unique, unparalleled opportunity for students to take control
of their own education. Delegates’ ability to work together, to compromise, and to accurately
advocate the policies of the nations they represent will ultimately determine the success of the
committee.
COMMITTEE HISTORY

In 1945, the international community founded the United Nations. The UN Security Council,
among the first main bodies created, was declared responsible for establishing and maintaining peace
and security on a global scale. Under the original UN Charter, the Security Council was entrusted
with important powers ranging from the ability to authorize military action to the creation of
peacekeeping missions. Today, the Security Council investigates disputes, formulates systems to
monitor sources of international friction, applies sanctions, and determines the existence of potential
or current hazards to international stability. In addition, the UN Security Council’s Charter includes
a “responsibility to protect” clause, ensuring that the committee exercises its diverse powers for the
good of humanity, especially in times of war, genocide, or other crimes against humanity.
The original founding members of the UN Security Council were the Allied Powers of World War
II: the United States, the Russian Federation, the People’s Democratic of China, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France. These members are called the
Permanent 5, or the P-5, because their position on the Security Council is permanent and because
they uniquely possess the ability to veto proposed resolutions. The remaining ten members of the
Security Council rotate membership based on geographic distribution requirements and upon
approval by the General Assembly. After election to the Council, these members remain on the
body for a two-year period. Additionally, the Presidency of the Council rotates every month based
on English alphabetical order.
The mandate of the UN Security Council is unique in the breadth of global issues it seeks to address
and discuss. The Security Council focuses on issues all around the world, and under Chapter 5,
Article 26 of the UN Charter, the Security Council works “to promote the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world’s
human and economic resources.”
To ensure that its mission is accomplished and its mandate maintained, the Security Council utilizes
an array of methods to inhibit international conflict. The first of these tools includes the declaration
of a cease-fire, stating that all involved in the issue abstain from further acts of violence or
potentially harmful behavior. Furthermore, the Security Council has the ability to position
peacekeepers in a given region to either supervise the withdrawal of troops, oversee a ceasefire, or
prevent aggressive powers from committing further acts of brutality. These peacekeeping forces are
always volunteered by member-states of the UN, as the United Nations itself does not possess any
formal standing military. Today, there are two different mandates for peacekeeping missions. The
first, outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, limits peacekeeping forces to monitoring ceasefires,
implementing confidence-building measures, and reporting overall progress. Secondly, the Chapter
VII mandate allows for the enforcement of a ceasefire agreement. Additionally, the Security Council
maintains the right to enforce economic sanctions on countries failing to obey international law.
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Finally, if all diplomatic, political, and economic steps still prove ineffective, the Security Council
may decide to deploy a collective military force of troops supplied by various member-states. Any
member-state that has continuously violated the UN Charter is also subject to expulsion from the
UN as a whole by choice of the General Assembly after recommendation by the Security Council.
In order to critically examine and dissect global issues, it is crucial to understand the function and
overall structure of the Security Council. Because of the body’s unique and complex agenda, work at
the National High School Model United Nations conference will need to encompass varying degrees
of strategies utilized by the Security Council for the purpose of upholding the committee’s mandate
and ensuring peace and stability worldwide.
Topic A: Combating Terrorism in Pakistan

Introduction
In the past decade, global terrorism has become an ever more pressing issue. In order to better
accommodate the changing forms and applications of terrorism, the United Nations Security
Council has aggressively discussed paths to control the spread of iolence. Global organizations and
individual countries alike have pursued a number of manners to stop terrorist attacks and cells from
forming. Since 2001, two wars were launched in Afghanistan and Iraq, ostensibly to fight terrorism
and its allies. Until the summer of 2009, the battle against insurgents in Afghanistan seemed
productive and successful. However, the situation is worsening and insurgencies are on the rise once
again, based in neighboring Pakistan. Unmanned drones have been successful in physically
destroying insurgent camps and killing their members, but the solution to a safer future for
Pakistan’s people requires a much more complex approach. These terrorists and developing
insurgency networks threaten the strength of Pakistan’s civilian government. Moreover, the weakly
patrolled Pakistan-Afghan border is a crossing point for neighboring terrorist organizations. The six
largest militaries in the world cannot control insurgents in the North Western Frontier Province
(NWFP), nor the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan’s newly elected officials
need to show the strength to overcome the insurgents in order to address immediate security
concerns and establish a solid framework for a civilian government. It is up to the Security Council
to facilitate this transition and to help develop new solutions.
HISTORY
Definition of Terrorism
The word “terrorism” and its definition have constantly changed since the word’s birth in France
during the late 1790s (Hoffman 16). When it first appeared, the word meant revolutionary or antigovernment activity undertaken by non-state or sub-national entities. “La régime de la terreur”
incorporated terrorism and terrorists to describe the newly formed government and intimidate its
opposition. Coined by Robespierre, the word held connotations of virtue and democracy, much the
opposite of its definition today. Today, the Oxford English Dictionary defines terrorism as, “A
policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods
of intimidation”. Following the supported Islamic and religious insurgency against the Soviet Union
throughout 1970s-1990s, terrorism in Pakistan became closely associated with religious extremism
(Abdaie, Gardeazabal 1). Terrorism has throughout history inhibited the development of countries.
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Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka and Pakistan are all countries that have spent countless resources on
combating terrorism that may otherwise have been available for industry and development.
Governmental operations are seriously affected by an effective terrorist attack. Following 9/11
global airport security skyrocketed, more money was poured into national defense and NATO
engaged the Taliban in Afghanistan – costing the United States US $171.1 billion and 675 military
lives (AFSC 3).
Background of Pakistan
Until 1849, the territory now known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was under the control of
various empires such as the Persian Empire, Greek Empire, Mauryan Empire and Mughal Empire.
As the Mughal Empire splintered, a group of small states, in the current region of the Punjab
province, formed a Sikh confederacy, which eventually expanded into the Sikh Empire. In 1849 the
British, under advisement of the British East India Trading company, annexed the Sikh Empire.
Eight years later, the Indian rebellion of 1857 encouraged a number of rebel groups to form in the
NWFP, among other areas, and started taking control away from the British. These groups were
labeled “freedom-fighters” by the Indian Nationalists. As the Indian nationalist movement gained
strength, Muslims feared that the Hindu majority would seek to suppress Muslim culture and
religion in an independent India. The Muslim League, operating under the influences of Maulana
Mohammad Ali’s Green Book, disagreed with many of the policies laid out by the Indian Congress.
However, with the guidance of Mahatma Ghandi, the two groups laid aside their issues in order to
seize control of their own territory from the
British. On 14 and 15 August 1947, British India
gave way to two new independent states, the
Dominion of Pakistan and the Union of India,
which both joined the British Commonwealth
(Indo 1). The process of splitting the country was
poorly executed, the job of drawing the official
borders was assigned to an official who was
unfamiliar with India at large as well as the vying
interests of Muslims and Hindus.
The
commission was also expected to create the
partition line as quickly as possible, meaning that
there was little time spent on researching the
resources and community atmospheres in the
partitioned states.
When attempting to
implement the planned divisions, Hindu’s and
Muslim’s rapidly migrated carrying fear and
resentment against the need to uplift their lives, and as the two migrating groups met, violence
erupted. It’s estimated that anywhere between 700,000 and 1 million died during the transfer to a
multiple state system (Chatterji 193). Furthermore, disagreement between Pakistan and India over
the divisions of Punjab, Bengal and Kashmir led to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 (Indo 1). The
war involved many small scale battles which eventually ended with a ceasefire on 31 December 1948
and the establishment of the “Line of Control,” which refers to the military control line for Indian
and Pakistani forces in the Jammu-Kashmir district (2). Following the ceasefire, Pakistan went
through a series of military and civilian governments. Between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan consisted of
two geographically separate regions, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, as seen in the map
(“Pehchaaan”).
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During the 1960s, there was a rise in Bengali nationalism/independence movement in East Pakistan
as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, of the Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) gathered support in West Pakistan (The
War 1). East Pakistan eventually declared its Independence as Bangladesh, and following numerous
guerilla conflicts with West Pakistan’s Army, the Pakistani army surrendered on 16 December 1971
(2). General Yahya Khan, who was leading Pakistan during the war, resigned his power to Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto following his embarrassing defeat.
Transition to an Islamic State
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ruled until a bloodless coup in 1977. He is most remembered for starting
Pakistan’s nuclear program and masterminding an assassination of an opposing political leader. This
attack provoked outcry in the NWFP and Balochisstan, which led him to deploy 100,000 soldiers, a
political move that divided the country. Following the 1977 military coup, which ousted Prime
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Huq abolished the
constitution and implemented martial law (Chossudovsky 2). He made various efforts to eliminate
traces of the previous government and worked to undermine the secular structures of the Pakistani
state that existed under Bhutto. Zia-ul-Huq implemented Nizam-e-Mustafa (Islamic System) a
complete transformation from Pakistan's predominantly Common Law. His first step was the
implementation of shari’a (Islamic law as defined in the Qur‘an and the Sunnah — the sayings of the
Prophet). This changed many of Pakistan’s common laws in the name of Islam: i.e. prohibition,
adultery, blasphemy, even the abolishment of profitable banks (Esposito 289). This inconsistency of
Pakistan’s legal structure characterizes its governmental history. Law was frequently changing or is
under threat of change because of differences of opinion among the ruling factions as Pakistan has
had only one peaceful transition of power (President Musharaff resigned in 2008 and Asif Ali
Zardari of the PPP was elected). Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization along with Pakistan’s involvement in the
Soviet-Afghan War contributed to increased fundamentalism around the country.
Soviet-Afghan War
When the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in Afghanistan in 1978,
it developed strong relations with the United States. In order to thwart Soviet expansion, the United
States supported Islamic brigades in an effort to destroy the newly formed secular civilian
government (Roy 3). Pakistan employed similar Islamic ideals and worked closely with the CIA to
help develop the ISI and fight with the PDPA. From 1982 to 1992, the ISI and CIA recruited and
trained 35,000 Muslims for the Afghan jihad against the Soviets (Chossudovsky 6). One of the main
contributing states was Saudi Arabia, which financed madrassas (Islamic schools) in Pakistan. The
hallmarks of CIA-ISI guerilla training remain prevalent in current terrorist attacks (i.e. targeted
assassinations and car bomb attacks). And, much of the transportation of personnel and arms for
the war went through the NWFP.
In 1979, the CIA recruited Osama bin Laden to establish charities and foundations to raise money
for the Islamic brigades. Many of these organizations that he helped create still exist today as a
means of channeling money, training and supplying insurgents throughout the NWFP and even in
ISI headquarters at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. In order to save face for the American mission against the
Soviet Union and ally closely with Afghanistan, the ISI acted as the liaison between the CIA and the
mujahedeen (plural of mujahid — someone who is involved in jihad). After Pakistan established
shari’a in December 1984, its support for the mujahedeen sky-rocketed (Chossudovsky 5). The
NWFP and the Khyber Pass proved essential to help move weapons and troops into Afghanistan.
With assistance of the United States National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166 — a
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presidential decree issued by Ronald Regan to provide military aid to the Mujahedeen — the amount
of weapons increased from 10,000 tons in 1983 to 65,000 in 1987 (McCoy 477).
Furthermore, in order to lessen the financial burden of the operation against the Soviet Union,
heroin labs were opened in Afghanistan to finance the Islamic brigades (Chossudovsky 10). The
establishment of the Golden Crescent Drug Trade further expanded the network of mujahedeen and
broadcasted their message to a larger audience. Their military success, vast network and opportunity
for martyrdom (a martyr in Islam is guaranteed a unique reward -- automatic admittance to heaven)
created numerous Islamic paramilitary groups (Dawud 516). However, because many of the groups
were so closely tied to the CIA or the ISI, few arrests were made and rebellious military groups were
allowed to thrive. Pakistan’s involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war ended in the early 1990s when
the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear developments. However, the militia
and insurgent groups remained. As the United States abandoned Pakistan and eventually
Afghanistan, the groups turned their hatred towards the West, most noticeably America (i.e. the
commencement of jihad’s the anti-western agenda).
Islam in Pakistan
Islam is the official religion of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with 97% of its total population
being Muslims (US Department 1). 70% of the Pakistani Muslims are Sunni while the remaining
30% identify as Shi’a. Islam was first brought to Pakistan by the Umayyad dynasty in 711 CE (Berzin
1). After many years of rule by multiple empires, the area currently known as Pakistan developed
into a central hub for Islam. Sufis, practitioners of the inner mystical dimensions of Islam, used
missionaries and teachings to convert most of the people in the region to Islam. Sir Allama
Muhammad Iqbal, a poet-philosopher first presented the idea of creating a Muslim state to the
Muslim League in 1930. He proposed to unify the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and
the North Western Frontier (practically modern-day Pakistan), but wanted to maintain a secular
government. When Prophet Mohammad established a government in Madina, he set up the
possibility for governance and religion to be unified.
It should also be noted that Islamism is a set of ideologies unifying Islam as a religion and political
system. Abul Ala Maududi, one of the founding fathers of modern Islamic thought, believed that
“the Muslim community’s decline resulted from practicing a corrupted form of Islam contaminated
by non-Islamic ideas and culture” (Gerges 1). He asserted that the integration of non-Islamic
notions was an insult to Allah. Maudaudi preached that the only way to purify their society was by
establishing Islamic states through militant jihad (striving in the way of Allah) (Meri 419). Hassan al
Banna, founder of the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), agreed with Maudaudi and
deemed “pure Islam” was the “antidote to Western domination and a cure for the malady infecting
the Muslim world” (Stanley 1). Sayyid Qutb, regarded by many as the theoretician of the
contemporary extremist movement, (Gerges 1) focused on removing non-Islamic leaders and
governments. Qutb and Banna started gathering support through schools, mosques, and factories
(just as modern extremist organizations). Qutb’s theory of unrestricted jihad “against every obstacle
that comes into the way of worshiping God and the implementation of the divine authority on
earth” is the roots of Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri (al-Qaeda leaders) and eventually the founding
of Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda (Gerges 1). These theoreticians laid the framework for Islam,
Islamism and Islamic Extremist. Lastly, one of the beliefs of Islamism is “that the purpose of the
state is to provide an environment where Muslims can properly practice their religion” (Pike 2).
Hence, if a leader fails such a task, he/she may be rightfully removed.
Recent History
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In August of 1988, acting President, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Huq was killed in an airplane crash.
To replace him, Pakistan held various elections, resulting in many power transitions and allegations
of corruption (Chossudovsky 8). Years of weak politics and division among the elite came to a halt
when General Pervez Musharraf led a coup in 1999. The previous years of corruption, aggressive
politics and militia factions weakened hopes of a unified and progressive Pakistan. Pakistan’s
economic development under General Musharraf signaled hope for a unified country. However,
when Benazir Bhutto, a trusted and prominent political leader, was assassinated, it drove the
divisions deeper and deeper. Recently, shifts towards democracy have weakened the local military
presence and allowed the criminal and insurgent groups established by the state 20-30 years ago to
thrive throughout the country — especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
in the NWFP, see in the map below (“Taliban Influence: FATA”).
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Throughout the early 2000s, Pakistan focused more on the reconstruction of their political and
governmental bureaucracy in Islamabad. This direction gathered support from the international
community, but diverted focus away from the lawless regions of the North. Resources were also
diverted away from the lawless regions because Pakistan had previously viewed an invasion from
India as the number one security risk towards Pakistani statehood. Lastly, Pakistan’s weak
bureaucratic control over the outlying areas allowed insurgent groups to form and networks to be
established in the NWFP and FATA -- where law could not be enforced. It wasn’t until 25 June
2009 that Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, said that terrorism is now Pakistan’s biggest threat,
not India (Kroft 1). The former security misguidance kept Islamabad distracted from the growing
insurgent groups in their western territories.
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From the end of 2008 and through the middle of 2009, insurgent attacks in the NWFP and FATA
soared. Militants took control of about 70% of the Malakand region by holding off 12,000
government troops with only 3,000 Taliban militants (Mass 1). Since moving troops to those areas in
2002, Pakistan has lost 1,300 troops in the conflict (Nawaz 13). Progressive officials from the secular
Awami National Party were elected to office in the region, but were swiftly assassinated by Taliban
suicide bombers (Roggio). The government has considered giving concessions to the insurgents,
such as peace treaties and instating shari’a law, but all of these have failed to bring peace to the
region. Attacks have not only been centered in the Swat valley; they have been distributed
throughout the Punjab Province, Peshawar, FATA, Karachi and many other areas. This recent surge
in violence comes as a harsh awakening to Pakistan and the international community. Terrorist
organizations from around the world, specifically Afghanistan, have been hiding in the NWFP and
FATA. This violence has displaced millions, killed thousands and questions the stability of the new
civilian government in Pakistan.
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas consist of seven Tribal Areas (called agencies) that border
Afghanistan to the west, Punjab and NWFP to the North and East, and Balochistan to the south.
The agencies are from north to south: Bajuar, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North
Waziristan and South Waziristan (Nawaz 2). The FATA encompasses 27,500 square kilometers and
are home to over 3.5 million Pakistanis and 1.5 million Afghani refugees. The FATA come under
the control of the President of Pakistan through the governor of the NWFP. The FATA operates
under the same regulations left by the British back in 1901. The Frontier Crimes Regulations has a
political agent who represents the President of Pakistan in each tribal agency. The local tribal leaders
have rejected the idea of a Federalist Pakistan. The FATA have representatives in the Pakistani
Congress, but are not allowed to organize political parties. Hence, all the Islamic candidates
campaigned through mosques and madrassahs (Islamic schools) and mullahs (muslim men, educated in
Islamic theology and sacred law) were elected. As a result, Islam has developed into a core
foundation for politics throughout FATA.
Rise of the Taliban
As NATO moved into Afghanistan in October of 2001, the Taliban and al-Qaeda entered into
FATA for protection. The Taliban used the FATA as a base from which to launch attacks into
Afghanistan and seriously undermines the NATO mission in Afghanistan. In 2004 Pakistan sent
80,000 troops into the FATA to search for al-Qaeda operatives. Both operations were ineffective, as
the troops met harsh resistance from the Taliban. The Pakistani Army tried to seize control eight
more times between 2004 and 2006 and met increasing resistance. The Taliban negotiated peace
accords, not the tribal leaders, indicating the long arm of the Taliban’s control. Working alongside
the mullahs, are the tribal maliks (influentials), these men deal with most of the day to day
governance of the region. Of the roughly 1,600 maliks in the region, the Taliban has assassinated 600
in the past few years (Nawaz 7).
Sectarian Violence
As extremism increases in the FATA, Sunni attacks on the Shi’a minority have surged. The Shi’a
minority retaliated by launching attacks against Sunnis in the Kurram agency, killing 1,500 and
wounding 500 (Nawaz 13). This sectarian violence had been nonexistent when the Shi’a, in need of
protection from the Sunnis, helped the government track down Taliban and al-Qaeda members
from Afghanistan who sought refuge in Tora Bora (Nawaz 14). But, since the surge of Sunni attacks on the
Shi’a in the past few years, the government’s non-intervention prompted the Shi’a to stop helping as
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well. Sectarian violence is only further complicated by the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
These organizations have allied with individual tribes to build a defense system against the Pakistani
government and NATO troops. This relationship between the insurgents and the tribes is one of the
biggest roadblocks to eliminating the terrorist organizations. In order to expose the network of
insurgents, the bond between the local tribesman and terrorists must be broken. See below for a
map of the FATA.
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Current Status
Introduction
For many years, the Taliban had large amounts of unregulated control in FATA and NWFP. Its size
grew, it launched attacks into Afghanistan, its leaders even held news conferences. However, the
Pakistan government does not support its continued existence. Many feel that it may be too late; the
situation is much more dangerous and difficult than it was ten years ago (Kroft 1). The international
community questions Pakistan’s devotion to the fight against global terrorism, and out of necessity,
has made some serious pushes on its own. This aggression has led Pakistan’s people to think that the
war they are fighting is America’s war (2). Many citizens see the US as an imperial power and relate it
to the Soviet Union, which they fought 20-30 years ago. Unmanned Predator drones have attacked
al Qaeda and Taliban targets inside Pakistan, and dozens of Pakistani bystanders have been killed.
Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistani intelligence officer, said, “I don’t think that Zardari has any
power. Zardari is only a puppet of United States here. He's here only because the United States
wanted him to be planted here" (3). Pakistan needs to convince its people that it is also their war,
not just America’s war. A RAND Corporation study titled How Terrorist Groups End cites that
effective police and intelligence work, not military force, bring superior counterterrorism results.
Pakistan, as it is slowly admitting, needs the help of the international community (4). If Pakistan is
not able to control the Taliban, its credibility will diminish and the country could experience an even
more volatile future.
Security Concerns
Military Defense
Combating terrorism in Pakistan is extremely difficult because of Pakistan’s location and geography.
Its position in southwest Asia bordering Afghanistan makes it nearly impossible to effectively
monitor and deal with the security situation. Without a secure border or strong relations with its
neighbors, Islamabad’s ability to govern Pakistan greatly diminishes (Gerges 12). For example, the
permeable border with Afghanistan has allowed the Taliban and al-Qaeda to move in and out of the
FATA and take over leadership from the tribal Sikhs. Creating and protecting a secure environment
and homeland was further complicated by the earthquakes in the north. This natural disaster
crippled Pakistan’s economy and challenged its security forces. Moreover, Pakistan’s unstable and
frequent regime changes have lowered the chances for long-term security and diplomacy in the
future. Much of this quandary, in the eyes of military defense, is not the government’s fault: it is alQaeda’s. Pakistan needs to prove to the world — and, more importantly, to its people — that its
borders are secure, and that people can carry on their lives without fear of terrorism.
To further complicate matters, the ongoing conflict with domestic militia groups require different
combat tactics than those taught during basic military training. For example, terrorist organizations
do not use organized battle techniques, but rather, mimic the guerilla warfare that was effective
during the Soviet-Afghan war. This type of combat makes it very difficult for basic infantry to
perform well against insurgents (Gerges 20). Because of this new “foreign” front, Pakistan’s military
requires completely new battle tactics and new technical support to track down and eliminate the
terrorists. Additionally, Pakistan has found itself battling both tribes and insurgents simultaneously.
The CTC does not direct military operations; however it may recommend and work alongside the
military in the physical and aggressive counter-terrorism action plans.
Nuclear Facilities
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Pakistan continues fissile material production, and its current nuclear arsenal consists of
approximately sixty nuclear warheads (Kronstand 62). According to Pakistani authorities, most
warheads are stored unassembled and separate from the nuclear fissile cores and are delivered to
launch sites separately to ensure security. The international community is becoming gravely
concerned with the destabilization of the NWFP due to eleven weapon assembly facilities,
plutonium extraction points and uranium enrichment centrifuge plants located there (Cirincione
238). While an overthrow of Islamabad by al-Qaeda is unlikely, there have been a number of attacks
on nuclear facilities in the past few years ("Pakistan Nuclear”). Additionally, by increasing the
concentration of forces in the NWFP, less security is available for central and southern nuclear
facilities.
Another growing concern is rogue security officials who may sympathize with insurgents. The
smallest leek in security could lead to the acquisition of nuclear material or means to attack a facility.
A successful attack on a nuclear facility could lead to widespread fatalities and radiation
contamination that would be extremely difficult to control. Pakistan, with the SC’s assistance, needs
to prove to the international community that it can effectively secure its nuclear facilities and operate
them for peaceful measures.
Fears of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of the Taliban grew stronger as insurgents
successfully attacked a bus filled with workers from Kahuta Research Laboratories (a producer of
weapons-grade uranium). Just before the attacks strengthened in late June, the Taliban and al-Qaeda
announced that their goal “is to topple the government and gain control of its nuclear arsenal.”
(Masood 1) The attack on the workers has undermined confidence in the Pakistani Armed Forces
— which the United States spent over US$100 million to train through 2009.
Controlling the Arms Trade
In addition to the growing concerns over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the arms trade
has grown significantly in the FATA and NWFTP regions following weakened government
presence. Terrorist groups, such as the Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba,
and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and al-Qaeda have all previously traded for arms in northern
Pakistan (Bajoria 1). According to analysts, about one hundred illegal weapons factories openly
furnish arms and explosives to Taliban fighters, local elders, and government officials in Darra
Adamkhel (a border town near Afghanistan) (Rahmanullah 1). Shahzad Arbab, a senior government
official in the tribal area, states “The government knows it must create jobs in textiles and other
industries to wean workers away from the illegal weapons industry. But for now, the Pakistan
government is helpless to stop them. These Taliban have full support of their respective tribes" (2).
This is often the case in the FATA especially in towns like Darra Adamkhel which has been under
Taliban rule since 2002 (2). Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s international networks have given it access to
wide-ranging arms trades. Al-Qaeda has come in the possession of high grade weapons and used
them against NATO troops in Afghanistan. Reports have been released stating that al-Qaeda is
pursuing chemical and biological weapons; however their possession of a Weapon of Mass
Destruction is far-fetched, and if it did occur, would not for a long time.
Supplying and Equipping Terrorists
One of the biggest issues at hand is the longevity of these terrorist organizations. Clearly, there are
not enough preventative measures in place to exclude terrorists from gaining access to funding,
weapons, or manpower. There has been much debate on whether the problem stems solely from
Pakistani regulations and personnel or if the issue is much more an international problem. Fiscal
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accountability remains a serious issue in Pakistan, as much of the funding of terrorists flows through
the Pakistani government (Advani 1). Ties from the Afghan-Soviet war still exist between insurgent
groups and government personnel. Recently declassified intelligence reports from the US
CIA/DOD by means of the Freedom of Information Act, prove that the Pakistani Frontier Corps
have been supplying and training Taliban for decades. (Department of State). Pakistani authorities
continue to deny all claims by US intelligence agencies. Therefore, as mandated by Security Council
Resolution 1373, the CTC must investigate procedures by which they may freeze the funds of the
terrorists and work with the Pakistani authorities to carry out article 2c of Resolution 1373, which
reads, “Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide
safe havens” (SC/1373). As Pakistan continues to deny any involvement with the Taliban, the
problem remains. Insurgents still gain access to funds, weapons and information that allow them to
further their operations.
Political Concerns
Limitations imposed by self-rule
All actions considered by the CTC must be approved by the Pakistani government. Moreover, the
Pakistani government’s ability to reject any plan, task force, personnel presence, etc., has troubled
foreign efforts to intervene. As cross-border Afghan-Pak violence intensifies, the US has implored
Islamabad to allow US military involvement along the border in order to prevent further escalation
in Afghanistan. In the past, the United States has offered to supply Pakistan with military support in
the troubled regions of the NWFP and FATA. However, Pakistan has continually denied such
requests for support, stating that the recent surge of violence is an internal issue. More likely,
Pakistan is wary of the United States committing forces in a way similar to Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, “fighting terrorism is
Pakistan’s own war” (Bajoria 1). In the interest of developing its own economy, curbing the
approximately 3.5% of GDP spent yearly on fighting terrorism, and rebuilding cities destroyed by
bombs and combat (Roman 2), Pakistan has called for large amounts of monetary aid (Rivers 1).
"Extremism and terrorism are our own problems. This is our own fight. This is our own cause…
My priority number one is to maintain law and order in the country ... and that's why it is in our own
interest that extremism and terrorism is contained.” (Gilani 1). The international community may
not take any direct action in Pakistan without its approval. However, as the problem grows beyond
Pakistan’s borders, the CTC holds the ability to bring together cooperating parties to find a
comprehensive and integrated approach to the situation.
Fiscal and Political Accountability
Many countries, including the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, have
questioned Pakistan’s use of funds provided to it for counter-terrorism efforts. For example, a
recent report issued by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated, “We
found that the Defense [department] did not consistently apply its existing CSF oversight guidance
and that certain deficiencies existed in Defense’s oversight procedures” (USGAO 3). These
discrepancies call into question the effectiveness of the Pakistani defense system and military
procedures. Recently, the GAO has released multiple reports calling for “Increased Oversight and
Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds.” (2)
Moreover, since 2001, the US has reported giving the Pakistani government US$10 billion to cover
the cost of moving troops into the NWFP and FATA (Gerges 10). However, the Pakistani Armed
Forces (Musalah Afwaj-e-Paksitan) claim they only received US$300 million in 2008 and that most of
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the money was absorbed by the Ministry of Finance. Pakistan has also received political pressure
from the international community to step up its COIN efforts (“A real offensive” 1).
Building off these fiscal and military problems — described by The Economist as a “phoney war”
claiming that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts are fake, politically driven actions with no real
ambition to kill off the insurgents. Poor bureaucratic control and security risks (due to insurgent control) have limited
Pakistan’s ability to govern to the extent that only 1.5 million (out of 175 million) Pakistanis pay taxes. Consistent
attacks on officials also limit governmental expansion and accountability (Roman). The poor fiscal
revenue generated from so few Pakistanis paying taxes, combined with the lawlessness in the FATA,
limits government prevention of terrorist activities and causes a circular reel of events. Poor
administration allows the Taliban to build enough strength until the international community puts
severe pressure on Islamabad, then a huge military operation occurs and a peace treaty is signed,
prompting six to twelve months of peace before the process repeats itself. When Prime Minister
Yousuf Raza Gilani called for aid without strings, he only further diminished Pakistan’s
accountability, which has slowed international contributions to Pakistani-led efforts and increasing
political turmoil and regional insecurity have slowed international and private investment (USGAO).
Economic Ramifications of Insurgency
The growing Islamist insurgent presence puts Pakistan’s economic viability into jeopardy and
therefore is of great concern to the Pakistani government. Private investors continue to shy away
from Pakistan, and the economic recession has decreased Pakistan’s annual GDP growth.
Decreasing tax revenues and the 2008-9 global recession could send Pakistan back to the
International Monetary Fund for another bailout in addition to US$7.6 billion given to them in
November. The United States and Japan have pledged US$5 billion USD in April 2009 to help
alleviate counter-terrorism expenditures. The NWFP accounts for 10% of the country’s GDP with
its huge mineral reserves, tourist attractions, and logging operations. Controlling major parts of the
NWFP places the Taliban in an ideal location for attacks on the Sindh and Punjab Provinces —
Pakistan’s economic hub and major source of tax revenue. According to Pakistan’s Finance Ministry,
the internal strife has cost the country 35 billion USD in the past six years, roughly 3.5% of the
country’s GDP. Moreover, with foreign investment expected to fall another 20% by the end of
2009 and GDP growth slumping from 7% to 2.5%, Pakistan is in need of an economically conscious
response to the insurgents. Pakistan needs to find ways to secure contributions to help rebuild the
northern region (Roman). Once funding is secured, the SC may help monitor the distribution of
funds and resources. By improving the security and credibility of an effective Pakistani government,
the SC will pave the road for future investment and prosperity.
Counter-Terrorism Legislation
Twelve years ago, Pakistan passed and implemented the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 intended to
“provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences
and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.” It also contains the bulk of Pakistan’s
legislation and formal responses to terrorists (E/CN.4/1997/60 13). This Act further provides
Islamabad’s broad definition of terrorism and gives the Anti-Terrorism Court dominion in all areas
of the country. Furthermore, the act helped solidify prosecution procedures and legal outcomes of
those convicted of participating in terrorist activities. It set the minimum sentence to seven years for
any man/women involved in terrorist activities. Any man who committed a terrorist act that resulted
in the death of another individual is punishable by death. Prior to the passage of this law, there was
no legal outline regarding terrorism. The SC has been working closely with Pakistan to review its
current procedures and augment them.
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The SC will assess the following: offences, penalties, competence of the courts, criminal procedure,
special investigation measures, legislation on weapons, explosives and dangerous substances and
legislation on asylum and immigration. They will also investigate new guidelines to prevent the use
of assets for criminal purposes, anti-money-laundering legislation and legislation against the
financing of terrorism. The last area of legislation that needs to be revamped is law enforcement
services, specifically, provision of counter-terrorism machinery, coordination of services, early
warning system and methods for combating and preventing criminal activities linked to terrorism
(“Press Kit”).
International Assistance and Collaboration
One of the main charges of the SC is to unite Islamabad and the international community to
facilitate the implementation of new counter-terrorism initiatives (CTC). To date, the CTC (a subset
of the SC) has conducted one site visit to Pakistan, the specifics of which are currently classified.
However, Pakistan had to answer critical questions regarding their counter-terrorism policies, mostly
in regards to its counter-terrorism legislation and fiscal defenses. Pakistan has received large
amounts of financial aid from the United States, European Union, and the IMF. However, it has
been reluctant to accept physical resources and training from western nations. The Pakistani
government fears that any American presence on the ground in Pakistan will deter confidence in
Islamabad’s ability to run the country effectively and will serve as just another extension of
American imperialism. Pakistan does not have a history of working effectively with its own people in
the rural areas. The FC has failed in cutting off the ties between tribal leaders and the insurgents.
Experts in the field of Pakistani relations cite the need to draw on the Pakistani people to get ideas
and complimentary motivation (Gerges 21). But, they do not have the resources to do so. The SC
must act as a liaison between the international community and on-the-ground efforts to fight
terrorism. Once the resources are attained, the SC must then monitor their use and distribution to
ensure that all possible efforts are made to combat terrorist organizations. Pakistan has also denied
requests to ratify certain key resolutions and key anti-terrorism legislation already passed by the
United Nations, such as 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, the 1980
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 1999 International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the 2005 International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (“Counter-Terrorism Activities”). These legislative
adjustments could ameliorate the global perception of Pakistan and theoretically increase aid and
support. The SC cannot end its efforts once the short term problems are resolved, it must establish
lasting ties between Pakistan and working organizations to ensure that Islamic extremism does not
continue to grow. It is important for Pakistan to work with all types of organizations, stretching
from the West to Islamic charities.
Humanitarian Concerns
Peace Treaties with terrorists
As mentioned, recent efforts by the various governments in Pakistan include signing peace treaties
with the Taliban and militia groups. On 16 February 2009, the Pakistani authorities signed a treaty
with the Taliban Movement of Swat, led by Maulana Fazlullah (Stack, 1). Fazlullah stated, "Once
Islamic law is imposed there will be no problems in Swat. The Taliban will lay down their arms" (1).
Shari’a law was implemented in the Swat valley, and the area remained stable for a few months until
the Taliban began attacking civilians and military troops once again – leading to the current crisis.
While these peace treaties are received well by locals, as they establish temporary peace and security,
they are frequently violated by the insurgents and only allow terrorist organizations time to regroup
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and regain their strength before launching more attacks. Despite this recurring cycle, groups like the
Swat Peace Committee push for peace agreements under the auspices that “For God’s sake, let’s
implement [a] deal. It will bring peace.” Such views cause dire problems for the government,
because if it wins the battle militarily and does not sign the treaty it could lose the political support
of the local population, which plays such an important role in the war on terror (“A Real” 3). Inamur-Rahman, an advocate for the peace treaties, states, “Even if you take a Pushtun person to
paradise by force, he will not go. He will go with you only by friendly means.” However, local militia
and tribesmen are being conceptually grouped with terrorists. Many of these tribesmen have taken
up arms in a manner of self-defense against the insurgents. Working with these locals to establish
strong political and economic ties would help to bring peace to the region as well as to build
alliances against the insurgents. In order to gain full control of the area, the government must
respond to the insurgencies with an appropriate amount of force to maintain the flow of donations
from the international community and simultaneously keep local support (“A Real” 6).
Aid for Internally Displaced Persons
Pakistan’s recent aggressive military response to the strengthening Taliban and other militia groups
has resulted in the displacement of massive numbers of Pakistani citizens — upwards of 1.9 million
(Montas 1). Only about 160,000 of these IDPs are living in the IDP camps while the remainders are
staying with relatives, in temporary housing, or in newly founded settlements which are at risk of
degenerating into slums. As the FC attempt to push the Taliban back out of the Swat valley, the
government encourages its citizens to return home. However, most of the villages have been leveled
and the citizens are returning to nothing. In 2005, the Pakistani military was able to successfully
provide for and rebuild the homes of those affected by the horrid earthquakes in the Pamir
Mountains; if they can repeat such triumph their global credibility will increase. Additionally, if the
government increases the provisions for IDPs and partners with the tribal leaders, it will maintain
the support of the people in the NWFP and aid efforts to defeat the Taliban.
Currently, Pakistan lacks many of the supplies needed to effectively support their IDPs due to their
bank fallout almost two years ago (See Economic Ramifications). Without a more stable economy or
increased assistance from NGOs and other governments, maintaining security and the well-being of
their own people will become a serious problem; those displaced by the conflict need supplies and
monetary assistance from the international community. Moreover, if the insecurity continues to
spread, access to Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass and other legally accessible routes will
effectively terminate, creating a poorly supplied, terrorized, and borderless region that will
undermine government and development efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistani
military has only minimal control of their borders and FATA/NWFP. If terrorism spreads to more
regions the military’s access to more areas will be restricted. If such a disaster occurs, the area that is
currently the breeding ground for terrorist groups, the drug and arms trades, and militia dissent
against the new Pakistani parliament will grow at disturbing and potentially uncontrollable rate.
Pakistani dissent towards the West has severely limited the amount of supplies that can be donated
to the relief effort. Because the government views the situation in the FATA and NWFP as an
internal issue, Pakistani authorities have refused to allow American officials or planes to deliver aid.
Many Pakistanis have poor memories of the West because of American drones bombing villages
(Bardsley 1). Because of the slow response of governmental relief efforts, Islamist charities have
placed themselves in an influential position, as they provide rapid and comprehensive aid in disaster
areas, allowing them to push their anti-Western agenda. Pakistan is attempting to rally public
support for the fight against insurgents and the Taliban by not allowing the presence of many
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western agencies. Although the lack of support sounds like a fault of the Pakistani authorities,
without the support of their own people, their battle against terrorism will fail no matter how much
aid is sent. Furthermore, one the most prominent jihadist charity groups, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (declared
a terrorist group by the UNSC), has rallied immense support through contributions to IDPs and
refugees, but has been barred from camps by Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmad (head of the Pakistani
Army’s disaster management group). This group along with others that were baned had been
entering camps in search of recruits for their organizations. The Jamaat-ed-Dawa is using its
donations to the people to buy their support and create an image that they’re fighting to help, not
causing chaos and violence. If violent jihadist groups continue to gain support from the local tribes,
Pakistan will need to muster more troops to combat a larger and more organized contingency.
With no government hospitals, very few doctors, low supplies, and essentially non-existent security,
loyalty to Islamabad is unreliable. Aid can get through to the people, but without recognition of the
donors as aid is not branded with the contributor’s flag or name. This political sacrifice, although for
the good of the cause, does little to improve international relations -- donations are rarely made
anonymously. According to United States Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Council on
Foreign Relations, “There is an opportunity actually to provide services, much as we did with the
earthquake relief, which had a profound impact on the perception of America” (Perlez).
Understandably, the US and other states are not eager to provide a government with supplies that
refuses to cooperate with their political agenda.
Important Terrorist Groups in Pakistan
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
The TTP refers to the Taliban movement in Pakistan and was officially formed in December of
2007 (Abbas 2). A shura (consultative committee) of forty Taliban established the TTP in northern
Pakistan with goals to: enforce shari’a, rid the FATA of any Pakistani military presence, and refuse
future peace deals with the government of Pakistan. Despite the organization’s infancy, it has grown
to command around 5,000 fighters, has representation from all of FATA’s seven tribal agencies, and
has moved into many districts of the NWFTP. Baitullah Mehsud, a 34-year old from South
Waziristan led this organization until he was killed on 5 August 2009 by a US airstrike (Walsh 1). In
2007, he captured 250 military personnel and held them hostage until 25 militants were released
(Abbas 3).
Prior to the establishment of this organization, the Pakistani Taliban operated separately from the
Afghani Taliban. In 2002, they started gathering sympathizers in the FATA for the war in
Afghanistan. The Afghani Taliban’s efforts led to the establishment of many extremist groups within
the FATA and started networking small cells together. This distinct makeup of merged terrorist cells
allowed them to integrate into Pakistani society by engaging in military attacks while cutting political
deals with the Pakistani government to establish their autonomy in the area (1). Some Pakistani
agencies have been sympathetic to the Taliban in order to control religious and sectarian violence
along the Afghani-Pakistan border. For example, the Taliban would promise to control sectarian
violence in exchange for certain freedoms. This approach worked almost perfectly. The Pakistani
Taliban effectively established themselves as an alternative leadership to the traditional tribal elders.
The Pakistani government didn’t recognize this transformation until it was too late and the Taliban
had out overthrown the traditional tribal leaders. The Taliban had killed approximately two hundred
of the tribal elders under charges of being Pakistani and American spies (Abbas 2). This
administration change, with little action from the government, created an entirely new and
unpredictable environment in the FATA.
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Lashkar-e-Omar (“The Army of Omar”).
In January 2002 three Islamic groups merged together to form Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO) (Lashkar-eOmar 1). While its ideology and goals are still mildly unclear, its foundation revolves around Islamist
extremisms and totalitarian politics. Experts speculate that the group was named after Mullah
Mohammad Omar, leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and adopted some of the same ideals (2).
The LeO, reportedly headed by Qari Asadullah, has a weak organizational structure which has
hampered its effectiveness. Despite its conglomerate origins, it has branched out to include many
“freelance” terrorists or “terrorists for hire” with similar ideas. Although the LeO’s widespread and
broad structure appears as a weakness, its many arms have developed close links with al-Qaeda and
several terrorist groups active in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir (3). This non-organized
structure limits the Pakistani Army’s ability to track and predict their actions. Additionally, many
members of LeO still maintain contacts from their former organizations. Radical, disoriented groups
like this may not be able to construct massive, detailed and thoroughly destructive attacks like the
Taliban, but their local resources and lack of authority places no limits on their objectives. The LeO
is suspected to be responsible for an attack on a Christian church in Punjab on 28 October 2002,
which killed a policeman and seventeen worshippers, including five children (2). It is also suspected
of kidnapping US journalist Daniel Pearl and bombing a church in Islamabad in which five people
were killed, including a US diplomat's wife and daughter. The LeO was reportedly involved in the
suicide bombing of the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi and the attack on the US consulate in Karachi in
2002.
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
The SSP is a Sunni sectarian group that primarily targets Shi’a communities. As 75% of Pakistanis
practice Sunni Islam, there has not been much response to their aggressive nature against the Shi’a
communities. The SSP was formed in the Punjab province during the Zia-ul-Haq regime to
overthrow the Shi’a landlords (“Sipah-e-Sahaba”, 1). The SSP receives much of their funding and
support from the working and peasants classes, especially shopkeepers who look to compete with
the Shi’a landlords in Punjab. The SSP actively opposes any US-Pakistani alliance and in addition,
joined the Afghan Jihad Council, which claims that the US action is not a war against Taliban but a
war against Islam. The SSP, run by Allama Ali Sher Ghazni, primarily targets prominent opposition
activists and fires on Shi’a worshippers in mosques (“Sipah-e-Sahaba” 1). Recently, the SSP has
begun to receive most of its funding from private Saudi Arabian investors (2). Moreover, the SSP is
one of the best-equipped terrorist groups. It possesses high grade weapons, such as rocket launchers
and surface to air missiles, and exerts much political influence. Considered to be one of the most
powerful Pakistani extremist groups, its influence extends throughout all four provinces and
reportedly has five hundred cells and offices in all 34 districts of Punjab. In addition to its domestic
presence it has expanded its influence into seventeen other countries including Saudi Arabia, Canada
and England (“Sipah-e-Sahaba”).
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda formed out of the Maktab al-Khidamat (a recruitment organization supported by the CIA
and ISI during the Soviet-Afghan war) ("Maktab al-Khidamat" 1). Al-Qaeda is an organization
separate from the Taliban, though they once shared a close relationship. The Taliban is a Sunni,
Islamist political movement that governed Afghanistan from 1996-2001. The Taliban remains solely
situated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The other publicized group in the region is Al-Qaeda, a
terrorist network established during the Afghan-Soviet War under the command of Osama bin
Laden. After the Soviet Union was defeated, the US and Pakistan discontinued their support for the
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mujahedeen. Throughout the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan, it sheltered al-Qaeda and its former
members. While being sheltered, al-Qaeda was allowed to expand into a global network of terrorists.
Its insurgent threat is small, but its networking capabilities, training facilities, and fiscal and military
backing make it one of the most dangerous organizations in the world. Its main objectives include
the end of foreign influence in Muslim countries and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate (a state
that, in theory, has political and spiritual control over Islamdom). Lastly, but most importantly, the
group believes and teaches that the killing of bystanders during war and civilians is religiously
justified in jihad. This belief gives the group ideological backing for suicide bombings and destroying
public property.
Why do people join the insurgents?
There are many reasons people choose to take up arms with the insurgents. For some school
dropouts, social misfits, economically disadvantaged, and army or police retirees, it is their only
option (Karim 50). Others wish to become local heroes or avenge wrong doings done to Sikh
community. In other situations, it is for their own security. As the number of attacks increase in the
rural villages, people need to find ways to protect themselves. In March 2009, under the “Village
Defence Rifle” program the Pakistani government handed out 30,000 rifles to “peaceful individuals
and organized groups” in the NWFP. chief minister Ameer Haider Hoti stated, “The move is aimed
at increasing cooperation between people and police to check the activities of terrorists and
saboteurs,” The government is now hesitant about providing weapons for self defense to its people.
The Taliban runs the open arms market in Darha and collects many of its recruits from this region.
Perhaps the most important ideological reason for why people join insurgent groups is a sense of
duty or loyalty to their homeland or people. The West has launched a series of aggressive wars that
have killed tens of thousands of innocent civilians on shoddy pretenses; this fact alone would
logically spur many young men into joining insurgent groups to defend their homelands for fear that
something similar could happen where they come from. The idea of “blowback,” and the theory that
the West’s interference into the affairs of the Islamic world, beginning with colonialism (Algeria,
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan) and ending with US interventions throughout the 20th and 21st centuries
(Afghanistan, Iraq) is a very important thing to consider. If this is one of the causes of the problem,
the SC should not support policies that continue the cycle of imperialism, colonialism, and
disrespect that has characterized interaction with the Islamic world since the 1800s.
Types of Terrorist Attacks
Events/Terrorist Acts
Related To
Assassination
Liquidation
of
political opponents
Communal riots
Alienation, migration
of minorities

Overall Gains
Short term and
limited
Anger, resentment Marginal effects on
destruction
of ethnic ratios in some
property
areas
Bomb attacks
Indiscriminate
Shock, anger and Very marginal
destruction of life fear
and property spreads
scare with little effort
Bank
robberies Collection of funds
Loss of confidence Substantial monetary
extortion
in authorities
gains
Demands
Khalistan: justice for Big appeal for Sikhs Moral isolation of
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Effect
Shock effect

Sikhs

creates resentment in
others
Arms and financial Attacks on security Larger numbers of
assistance abroad
forces: substance of civil and paramilitary
movement
attack casualties
new recruits
Attack
on
civil Stoppage of work; Work has suffered
engineers
and dharma yudh
delays
workers
(Pakistan Factor, 45-46)

Sikhs
largely
achieved
Increase
state
repression:
demoralize security
forces
Major gain, though
temporary

Conclusion

Improvement seems to be arriving; Pakistan increased its counter-terrorism efforts immensely
between May and July 2009. Nevertheless, such short-term successes have been a common feature
in Pakistan over the past ten years with limited long-term impact. Pakistan’s military force,
composed of roughly 600,000 troops, is able to respond to most conventional military attacks
successfully (“Pakistan Military Guide”). However, as towns grow into cities and insurgents
mobilize, changes must be made. Despite this changing threat, The Frontier Corps (Pakistan’s
branch of the Army) was trained for peacetime operations, not counter-insurgency (20). There is
little room or plans for sustainability. Their current and weak long-term proposal, along with
immediate security struggles has rendered most counter-terrorism efforts unorganized and
ineffective. There needs to be more focus on this volatile region not only resource wise but
administratively as well — only 30-38% of the development, security and humanitarian funds
actually reach FATA because there is no staff to monitor them (21). The random suicide bomber or
shooting is almost impossible to predict or stop when manufactured on such a small level (i.e. by
one cell, not a network). Islamic extremism is an issue, as some madrassahs have developed into
centers of Islamic radicalism and recruitment for the Taliban (Rashid 185). Additionally, on 28 May
2009, Taliban commander, Baitullah Mehsud, told the international press, “We want the people of
Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Multan to leave those cities, as we plan major attacks against
governmental facilities in coming days and weeks” (Kaya 1). Despite Pakistani forces clearing 70%
of Mingora, the largest city in the Taliban-controlled Swat valley and killing 1,100 militants, the
conflict is far from over. This also shows that a pure military option is not the answer –
humanitarian and economic development will likely be the keys to solving the issue. The United
States’ operation in Afghanistan depends on transit shipments via Pakistan for 80% of its cargo and
40% of its fuel (10). Without these shipments, the situation in Afghanistan will continue to
deteriorate only furthering the burden on the FATA and in the NWFP. Asif Ali Zardari, a journalist
from the Washington Post, correctly stated in referring to the region, “Failure is not an option; not
for us, not for the world.”
Committee Representatives

Togo
Togo’s foreign policy is nonaligned, but has strong ties with Western nations. Togo is in favor of
regional integration methods as it has been a strong participant in the African Union.
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Morocco
Morocco has had its own troubles with state sponsored terrorism, but has bilateral relations with
Pakistan. Pakistan does not recognize Western Sahara and supports Morocco’s view that this is an
internal matter. Morocco is likely to view Pakistan’s suppression of terrorist organizations as internal
as well. Morocco will not be an aggressive advocate of intervention, but will work to find solutions
that appease Pakistan.
South Africa
South Africa does not support continued growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, having given up its
own two decades back. South Africa supports positive engagement mechanisms to slow violence
and is not in favor of aggressive military interventions. It will support the rule of law, but also the
ability of Pakistan to try its own citizens how it pleases.
India
India and Pakistan share a long and complex history marked by a joint independence struggle, the
eventual establishment of two separate nations, and subsequent wars and violence associated with
the division of the subcontinent which still haunt these two uneasy neighbors. Relations today are
still impacted by tensions produced in the 1947 British Partition, India’s assistance to Bangladesh
during its independence movement, and the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Immediately after the
partition, India and Pakistan shared fairly diplomatic relations, however, the resulting mass migration
of people to their “respective” nations, created large amounts of unrest and violence (Independence
War of Bangladesh). Also, disagreement over disputed territories, including Kashmir, turned the
neighbors against one another. Since then, Pakistan and India have fought three wars over Kashmir
while simultaneously cultivating their respective nuclear weapons’ programs. Attacks by Pakistanibased terrorist groups have stalled once productive bilateral talks between the neighbors, straining
and eliminating diplomatic channels of communication. Tensions with India must be relaxed and
enduring problems addressed in order for the promotion of stability on the subcontinent
(Wynbrandt).
European Union (France, UK, Germany, Portugal)
Since opening diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1947, European countries have since then
donated over $10 billion in aid to the country. In 2009 the European Union donated $100 million to
Pakistan in order to help relieve the devastation brought about by instability in the region. During
the Cold War, specific members of the EU, including the United Kingdom and France, pushed for
the formation of a jihad against the Soviet Union, further deepening, but also complicating, this
relationship. Ties between the UK and Pakistan have changed over time from deep resentment prior
to the Partition to more diplomatic ones seen today (Wynbrandt). Germany and Pakistan have
consistently enjoyed a close relationship both economically and politically. Other countries of the
European Union generally share strong ties with Pakistan and have been willing to support its
efforts towards democracy and stabilization, while supporting US claims that Pakistan must make a
larger effort to combat terrorism on its soil (New York Times).
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan and Pakistan have become increasingly close in the past decade, with Pakistan supporting
Azerbaijan’s position on the Upper Garabagh conflict. Similarly, Azeraijan has noted Pakistan plays
a strong role in fighting international terrorism, and believes both countries share similar struggles.
Azerbaijan hopes to improve trade relations with Pakistan and will not risk losing an important ally
in its own regional struggles.
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Colombia
Colombia shares Pakistan’s problem of insurgent groups, and thus can empathize will the challenges
faced by the government. Colombia will support increased international aid for Pakistan, but will
take a strong stance when assistance packages threaten national sovereignty. This representative will
favor institutional improvements which bolster the government’s authority. Colombia understands
the need to balance military control with a stable civilian government, something Pakistan has
struggled to accomplish since the states formal inception.
Guatemala
Pakistan and Guatemala have only officially established diplomatic relations this past October.
Guatemala is seriously concerned with the trafficking of illicit drugs, as it is a transit country for
cocaine and opium. The US also provides large amounts of aid to Guatemala. Guatemala originated
the idea for a Central American Parliament, and thus would be in favor of regional solutions to
various issues. However, Guatemala would like to see increased trade and stronger institutional
frameworks emerge in a variety of global issues.
Russia
Russia has cooperated with Indian and China on security issues in the region. More importantly,
Russia is very much on board with the idea of a concerted campaign against terrorism in the region.
Pakistan was the original feeder of the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan war. Consequently,
Russia does not have a soft spot for this struggling state. Like the US, Russia views its primary
threats as emanating from an array of transnational actors. However, Russia is not directly
threatened by terrorist attacks, it is more concerned with the development of religious extremism
and internal threats it will pose if the cause spreads.
Pakistan
Pakistan holding a seat will present challenges to the council. Pakistan resists continued influence
and intervention by western nations and their regimes. The number one security threat, in the minds
of the government, is not the al-Qaeda and Taliban in the west, but the threat India poses. The U.S.
has a long history of financial support to Pakistan, a facet Islamabad does not want to see fade.
However, gaining the trust and support of their people will take precedence over American
demands.
China
The People’s Republic of China has a dynamic relationship with its regional neighbor and border.
China has built an alliance out of necessity; it does not want to see India become too powerful.
China has sold nuclear reactors and other devices to Pakistan and jointly resisted India’s territorial
claims. However, China lays claim to a parcel of land in the Jammu and Kashmir region. China does
not want American troops in a border country; neither will it allow terrorist groups to operate along
its penetrable border. The PRC views this relationship from a business perspective, it’s not out to
make friends, but it’s not out to risk it all either.
United States
Under Prime Minister Liaqut Ali Khan, Pakistan attempted to remain neutral, a decision that cost
Pakistan in a time where it needed allies and assistance (Insight on Conflict). However, in the 1960’s
the US and Pakistan maintained strong military ties as the US established three air bases within
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Pakistan, helping in the US fight against the Soviets. Pakistan remains one of the most crucial nonNATO allies of the US, although relations have been strained in the recent events surrounding the
death of Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, since 2004, the US has initiated drone attacks on the tribal
regions of Pakistan, most notably the FATA where al-Qaeda and other militant groups are known to
operate. While the Pakistani government has condemned these attacks in the past, a Wikileaks article
released by Pakistan's Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani showed that the government actually
requested that the US increase the number of drone attacks in the FATA and northern regions.
Also, since the dead of Osama bin Laden, the US has cut funding to Pakistan by hundreds of
thousands of dollars fearing its efforts to confront terrorism are limited and its actions do not match
its rhetoric.
Attaché from the NATO mission in Afghanistan
The conflict in Afghanistan is very closely tied to the recent insurgency in Pakistan, through history,
culture and tribal lineage. These similarities make appropriate communication with the NATO
mission in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has occupied Afghanistan since a
coalition, led by the United States, invaded in early 2002. These troops have the resources and
training to properly carry out COIN. Moreover, many of the refugees in Pakistan hail from
Afghanistan and members of the Taliban and different militia groups currently and extensively seek
refuge in FATA and NWFP. NATO helped dramatically after the earthquake of 2005 destroyed
many parts of Pakistan, rebuilding infrastructure and houses across the country. Since then, the two
groups have discussed the potential of regional security often, especially in regard to the situation in
Afghanistan. Very recently however, this strong relationship has been put to the test with NATO
bombings of Taliban forces operating within Pakistan. Relations following the death of Osama bin
Laden have been shaky and NATO continues to demand amplified efforts in fighting terrorism. The
Obama administration has also struggled with Pakistan, fearing that due to recent conflict, Pakistan
will shut down transit into Afghanistan that helps supply US troops in the region (Masood 1). In
September 2010, Pakistan restricted NATO supplies from entering Afghanistan by shutting down
the land route necessary for doing so. More recently, when two NATO helicopters entered 400
yards into Pakistani airspace, firing took place between Pakistani soldiers on the ground and the
NATO troops. Since the incident, both sides are still trying to mend ties, although the amount of
mistrust amongst political leaders and citizens alike is incredibly high, making any hope of peaceful
negotiation very difficult (Crilly 1). The attaché from the NATO mission in Afghanistan must work
to establish an effective border, ameliorate relations between the two nations and halt cross border
religious conflict (Shia vs. Sunni). This delegate has the ability to reorder NATO’s mission in
Afghanistan (with full permission of its headquarters) to better improve border relations with
Pakistan.
Attaché from UNHCR
This delegate’s main role in this committee is protection of refugees. As the issue of terrorism
demands international scope, especially in this region, this delegate must safeguard refugees in order
to avoid a diplomatic crisis. Basically, make sure refugees aren’t being targeted by certain groups and
are equally protected regardless of history or religious affiliation. This representative will be
responsible for maintaining the flow of aid to the refugees of terrorist attacks or counter-attacks by
government troops. This delegate should research how current refugees are living and where. In
regards to camps, he/she must be knowledgeable of their sizes and capacities. The delegate should
also familiarize his/herself with previous issues concerning refugees in Pakistan, such as the flow of
persons through the Khyber Pass.
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IAEA representative
The representative from the International Atomic Energy Agency will serve to protect nuclear safety
in Pakistan. As mentioned earlier in this Background Guide, extremist groups aim to take control of
some of the nuclear plants in Pakistan and have already started targeting their employees. The
security threat of these nuclear power plants is a grave concern to the international community. The
idea of a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade plutonium falling into the hands of a terrorist
organization should be feared by all. Additionally, the IAEA representative will need to ensure that
the probability of an attack on a nuclear facility remains low. He/she should also make sure that
Pakistan does not underestimate any threats on their nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the IAEA will
have a strong background in the proper use and distribution of nuclear energy. Pakistan is not a
signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is not bound to tell the IAEA about all its
nuclear activities. This representative must research efforts to circumvent this in order to ensure
nuclear safety in Pakistan.
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Research and Preparation Questions:
1. How should terrorism in Pakistan be addressed? Is international intervention warranted or
have current events with organizations such as NATO proved that this only creates more
conflict? Does your country have a history of dealing with terrorism, how has it responded?
2. What are three main reasons why terrorists groups are still growing in the FATA and
NWFP?
3. How important of a role should the United States’ War on Terror play in Pakistan’s own
counter-insurgency efforts?
4. What are some immediate short term efforts the SC could make to help improve the
situation in Pakistan?
5. How can anti-terrorism efforts utilize the contributions of the Pakistani people?
6. Examine the importance of Islam in the culture of the Pakistani people and how it affects
the country’s political and cultural structure.
7. As there are multiple terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan, which group threatens the
region the most and why? How are these groups threatening the security of Pakistan? Is
there a possibility of one of these groups gaining nuclear capabilities?
8. What steps should the SC and other international organizations take to assist Pakistan as
much as possible while regarding its national sovereignty?
9. How should Pakistan’s humanitarian crisis be addressed? Does it simply need more
international aid? Less aid? Is this a domestic, regional, or international problem? Whose
responsibility is it to fix?
10. What needs to be done to secure the economic situation in Pakistan? Will increasing
international trade help the Pakistani economy or should the state focus its energy on
developing its agriculture and deepening internal goods? How can Pakistan grow more
independent of the national bank?
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APPENDIX D

Creative Thinking Rubric
Definition
Creative thinking is both the capacity to combine or synthesize existing ideas, images, or expertise in original ways and the experience of thinking,
reacting, and working in an imaginative way characterized by a high degree of innovation, divergent thinking, and risk taking.
A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

Solving Problems

Innovative Thinking
Novelty or uniqueness (of idea,
claim, question, form, etc.)
Connecting,
Synthesizing,
Transforming

Capstone (4)
Not only develops a logical,
consistent plan to solve
problem, but recognizes
consequences of solution
and can articulate reason for
choosing solution.
Extends a novel or unique
idea, question, format, or
product to create new
knowledge or knowledge
that crosses boundaries.
Transforms ideas or
solutions into entirely new
forms.

Milestones (3)
Having selected from
among alternatives,
develops a logical,
consistent plan to solve the
problem.

Milestones (2)
Considers and rejects less
acceptable approaches to
solving problem.

Benchmark (1)
Only a single approach is
considered and is used to
solve the problem.

Creates a novel or unique
idea, question, format, or
product.

Experiments with creating a
novel or unique idea,
question, format, or
product.

Reformulates a collection of
available ideas.

Synthesizes ideas or
solutions into a coherent
whole.

Connects ideas or solutions
in novel ways.

Recognizes existing
connections among ideas or
solutions.
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Critical Thinking Rubric
Definition
Critical thinking is a habit of mind characterized by the comprehensive exploration of issues, ideas, artifacts, and events before accepting or formulating
an opinion or conclusion.
A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

Student's position
(perspective,
thesis/hypothesis)

Conclusions and related
outcomes (implications
and consequences)

Capstone (4)
Specific position
(perspective,
thesis/hypothesis) is
imaginative, taking into
account the complexities of
an issue.
Limits of position
(perspective,
thesis/hypothesis) are
acknowledged.
Others' points of view are
synthesized within position
(perspective,
thesis/hypothesis).
Conclusions and related
outcomes (consequences
and implications) are logical
and reflect student’s
informed evaluation and
ability to place evidence and
perspectives discussed in
priority order.

Milestones (3)
Specific position
(perspective,
thesis/hypothesis) takes
into account the
complexities of an issue.
Others' points of view are
acknowledged within
position (perspective,
thesis/hypothesis).

Milestones (2)
Specific position
(perspective,
thesis/hypothesis)
acknowledges different
sides of an issue.

Benchmark (1)
Specific position
(perspective,
thesis/hypothesis) is stated,
but is simplistic and
obvious.

Conclusion is logically tied
to a range of information,
including opposing
viewpoints; related
outcomes (consequences
and implications) are
identified clearly.

Conclusion is logically tied
to information (because
information is chosen to fit
the desired conclusion);
some related outcomes
(consequences and
implications) are identified
clearly.

Conclusion is inconsistently
tied to some of the
information discussed;
related outcomes
(consequences and
implications) are
oversimplified.
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Foundations and Skills for Lifelong Learning Rubric
Definition
Lifelong learning is “all purposeful learning activity, undertaken on an ongoing basis with the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competence”. An
endeavor of higher education is to prepare students to be this type of learner by developing specific dispositions and skills (described in this rubric)
while in school. (From The European Commission. 2000. Commission staff working paper: A memorandum on lifelong learning. Retrieved September
3, 2003, from www.see-educoop.net/education_in/pdf/lifelong-oth-enl-t02.pdf.)
A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

Curiosity

Initiative

Transfer

Capstone (4)

Milestones (3)

Milestones (2)

Benchmark (1)

Explores a topic in depth,
yielding a rich awareness
and/or little-known
information indicating
intense interest in the
subject.
Completes required work,
generates and pursues
opportunities to expand
knowledge, skills, and
abilities.
Makes explicit references to
previous learning and
applies in an innovative
(new and creative) way that
knowledge and those skills
to demonstrate
comprehension and
performance in novel
situations.

Explores a topic in depth,
yielding insight and/or
information indicating
interest in the subject.

Explores a topic with some
evidence of depth,
providing occasional insight
and/or information
indicating mild interest in
the subject.
Completes required work
and identifies opportunities
to expand knowledge, skills,
and abilities.

Explores a topic at a surface
level, providing little insight
and/or information beyond
the very basic facts
indicating low interest in the
subject.
Completes required work.

Makes references to
previous learning and
attempts to apply that
knowledge and those skills
to demonstrate
comprehension and
performance in novel
situations.

Makes vague references to
previous learning but does
not apply knowledge and
skills to demonstrate
comprehension and
performance in novel
situations.

Completes required work,
identifies and pursues
opportunities to expand
knowledge, skills, and
abilities.
Makes references to
previous learning and shows
evidence of applying that
knowledge and those skills
to demonstrate
comprehension and
performance in novel
situations.
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Information Literacy Rubric
Definition
The ability to know when there is a need for information, to be able to identify, locate, evaluate, and effectively and responsibly use and share that
information for the problem at hand. - The National Forum on Information Literacy.
A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

Use Information
Effectively to Accomplish
a Specific Purpose

Capstone (4)
Communicates, organizes
and synthesizes information
from sources to fully
achieve a specific purpose,
with clarity and depth

Milestones (3)
Communicates, organizes
and synthesizes information
from sources. Intended
purpose is achieved.
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Milestones (2)
Communicates and
organizes information from
sources. The information is
not yet synthesized, so the
intended purpose is not
fully achieved.

Benchmark (1)
Communicates information
from sources. The
information is fragmented
and/or used inappropriately
(misquoted, taken out of
context, or incorrectly
paraphrased, etc.), so the
intended purpose is not
achieved.

Inquiry and Analysis Rubric
Definition
Inquiry is a systematic process of exploring issues/objects/works through the collection and analysis of evidence that result in informed
conclusions/judgments. Analysis is the process of breaking complex topics or issues into parts to gain a better understanding of them.
A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.
Capstone (4)
Organizes and synthesizes
evidence to reveal insightful
patterns, differences, or
similarities related to focus.

Milestones (3)
Organizes evidence to
reveal important patterns,
differences, or similarities
related to focus.

Conclusions

States a conclusion that is a
logical extrapolation from
the inquiry findings.

Limitations and
Implications

Insightfully discusses in
detail relevant and
supported limitations and
implications.

States a conclusion focused
solely on the inquiry
findings. The conclusion
arises specifically from and
responds specifically to the
inquiry findings.
Discusses relevant and
supported limitations and
implications.

Analysis
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Milestones (2)
Benchmark (1)
Organizes evidence, but the Lists evidence, but it is not
organization is not effective
organized and/or is
in revealing important
unrelated to focus.
patterns, differences, or
similarities.
States a general conclusion
States an ambiguous,
that, because it is so general, illogical, or unsupportable
also applies beyond the
conclusion from inquiry
scope of the inquiry
findings.
findings.
Presents relevant and
supported limitations and
implications.

Presents limitations and
implications, but they are
possibly irrelevant and
unsupported.

Problem Solving Rubric
Definition
Problem solving is the process of designing, evaluating, and implementing a strategy to answer an open-ended question or achieve a desired goal.
A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.
Capstone (4)
Demonstrates the ability to
construct a clear and insightful
problem statement with
evidence of all relevant
contextual factors.

Milestones (3)
Demonstrates the ability to
construct a problem statement
with evidence of most relevant
contextual factors, and problem
statement is adequately detailed.

Identify Strategies

Identifies multiple approaches
for solving the problem that
apply within a specific context.

Identifies multiple approaches
for solving the problem, only
some of which apply within a
specific context.

Propose
Solutions/Hypotheses

Proposes one or more
solutions/hypotheses that
indicates a deep comprehension
of the problem.
Solution/hypotheses are
sensitive to contextual factors
as well as all of the following:
ethical, logical, and cultural
dimensions of the problem.
Implements the solution in a
manner that addresses
thoroughly and deeply multiple
contextual factors of the
problem.
Reviews results relative to the
problem defined with thorough,
specific considerations of need
for further work.

Proposes one or more
solutions/hypotheses that
indicates comprehension of the
problem. Solutions/hypotheses
are sensitive to contextual
factors as well as the one of the
following: ethical, logical, or
cultural dimensions of the
problem.
Implements the solution in a
manner that addresses multiple
contextual factors of the
problem in a surface manner.

Define Problem

Implement Solution

Evaluate Outcomes

Reviews results relative to the
problem defined with some
consideration of need for
further work.
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Milestones (2)
Begins to demonstrate the
ability to construct a
problem statement with
evidence of most relevant
contextual factors, but
problem statement is
superficial.
Identifies only a single
approach for solving the
problem that does apply
within a specific context.
Proposes one
solution/hypothesis that
is “off the shelf” rather
than individually designed
to address the specific
contextual factors of the
problem.
Implements the solution
in a manner that addresses
the problem statement but
ignores relevant
contextual factors.
Reviews results in terms
of the problem defined
with little, if any,
consideration of need for
further work.

Benchmark (1)
Demonstrates a limited
ability in identifying a
problem statement or
related contextual
factors.
Identifies one or more
approaches for solving
the problem that do not
apply within a specific
context.
Proposes a
solution/hypothesis that
is difficult to evaluate
because it is vague or
only indirectly addresses
the problem statement.

Implements the solution
in a manner that does
not directly address the
problem statement.
Reviews results
superficially in terms of
the problem defined with
no consideration of need
for further work

(Role-Playing and Simulation Based Learning in Higher Education: Case Study in Model United
Nations)
Senior Capstone Project for (Jason C. Fortin)

APPENDIX E
United Nations Quiz
Number: _________________

Date: ________________

1. The United Nations has an army. True or False.
2. The United States is the largest supplier of peacekeepers to the United Nations. True or
False
3. When was the UN founded?
a. 1945
b. 1954
c. 1930
d. 1927
4. Where are the Headquarters of the UN?
a. Paris
b. London
c. New York
d. Washington
5. Who is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations?
a. Kofi Annan
b. Ban Ki Moon
c. Hu Jintao
d. Nicholas Sarkozy
6. What is the name of the document which outlines the aims of the UN and the rights and
obligation of each member state?
a. The United Nations Treaty
b. The United Nations Charter
c. The United Nations Agreement
7. The UN’s budget comes from country’s based on their
a. Size of population
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b. Size of economy
c. Desired contribution amount
d. Location
8. How many Security Council members have veto power, and what are they?
9. How many states are members of the UN?
10. How many members are on the UN Security Council?
11. Which member has cast the most Veto votes?
12. What do the following acronyms stand for?
a. WHO
b. ECOSOC
c. IMF
d. WTO
e. WB
f. UNICEF
g. UNESCO
h. ICJ
i. ICC

Pakistan Quiz
1. Pakistan is an Islamic state. True or False
2. Pakistan receives aid from the United States. True or False
3. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. True or False
4. Al-Qaeda is the largest terrorist group in Pakistan. True or False.
5. The current president of Pakistan is________.
6. The capital of Pakistan is_______.
7. The word jihad means _______.
8. Pakistan has a population of
a. 50 million
b. 100 million
c. 180 million
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d. 127 million
9. Drone attacks have killed
a. 500 persons
b. 1000 persons
c. 2300 persons
d. 300 persons
10. Out of the total persons killed by drone attacks what percent were civilians?
a. 5%
b. 50%
c. 10%
d. 25%
11. Pakistan was declared a state in what year?
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